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THE RISE OF BALANCED BUDGET
LAWS IN CANADA: LEGISLATING
FISCAL (IR)RESPONSIBILITY©
BY LISA C. PHILIPPS*
Virtually unknown in Canada before the 1990s,
balanced budget legislation has suddenly become
popular across the country. The author examines the
wide diversity of mechanisms being used to limit state
fiscal powers, including spending caps, anti-deficit
rules, and tax referenda. Evaluating these measures,
the author raises concerns about the impact of
balanced budget laws on economic stability, social
justice, and political democracy. She warns against
discounting either their instrumental effects or their
power to shape public finance discourse. Though some
provinces have adopted less severe versions, the author
concludes that these efforts only partially mitigate the
dangers of balanced budget laws.
Virtuellement inconnue au Canada avant les ann6es
quatre-vingts, les lois visant l'6quilibre budg6taire
gagnent en popularit6 A travers le pays. L'auteure
examine la diversit6 des m~canismes utilis~s afin de
limiter les pouvoirs fiscaux de l'ttat, incluant les limites
de d6penses, les ragles anti-d6ficits et les r6f6rendums
fiscaux. En 6valuant ces mesures, l'auteure soul~ve ]a
probldmatique de l'impact des lois visant l'quilibre
budg6taire sur la stabilit6 dconomique, la justice
sociale, et la ddmocratie politique. Comme le pr6vient
l'auteure, il ne faut pas sous-estimer les effets
contributifs de ces lois nile pouvoir desdites lois afin
d'influencer le discours en mati~re de finance publique.
Bien que quelques provinces aient adopt6 des versions
moims contraignantes, l'auteure conclut que ces efforts
n'att6nuent que partiellement les dangers d6coulant
des lois visant l'quilibre budg6taire.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Fiscal restraint and deficit reduction have become virtual
mantras for all levels of Canadian government in the 1990s, regardless of
geographic or political affiliation. An attitude of skepticism toward
government spending, borrowing, and taxing has established itself as the
political norm and shows few signs of dissipating even as federal and
provincial governments begin to report dramatically lower deficits and,
in some cases, budget surpluses.' This article examines the sudden
mania for balanced budget legislation in Canada as one expression of
this new found politics of fiscal austerity. In recent years most of our
provincial and territorial legislatures have passed laws to prohibit
budgetary deficits, or to limit other fiscal policy making powers
1 See K. Treff & D.B. Perry, 1996 Finances of the Nation (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation,
1997) c. 2. The most striking case is in Alberta, where severe expenditure cuts have been followed
by an estimated 2.2 billion dollar surplus for the 1996-97 fiscal year: Alberta, Department of
Finance, Budget '97- BuildingAlberta Together (Edmonton: Queen's Printer, 22 February 1997). The
federal deficit has also declined far more quickly than forecast. Private sector economists are now
predicting a surplus by fiscal year 1998-99: see S. McCarthy,"Debt Burden is Next Liberal Target"
The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (17 June 1997) Al. The government's projections are more cautious:
see Canada, Department of Finance, Budget Plan including supplementary information and notices of
Ways and Means Motions! tabled in the House of Commons by the Honourable Paul Martin, Minister of
Finance (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 18 February 1997) [hereinafter Budget 97] at 10-20.
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traditionally exercised by their executive governments. Tax referendum
laws, spending caps, debt repayment mandates and other legal
mechanisms are springing up in increasing numbers, and may well
proliferate further. In Ontario, so far a notable holdout, both
Progressive Conservative leader Mike Harris and Liberal leader Lyn
McLeod pledged during the 1995 election campaign that they would
bring in balanced budget laws of some kind. Others are promoting the
idea of federal legislation, or even a constitutional amendment. 2
Though novel in Canada, fiscal limitation laws have a long
history in the United States, particularly at the state government level.
Recent proposals for a balanced budget amendment to the United
States Constitution have been rejected by only the narrowest of margins
and have generated vigorous debate among American politicians and
academics.3 By comparison, the rise of balanced budget legislation in
Canada has attracted remarkably little sustained analysis. Proponents
claim that legal constraints are needed to counteract a propensity for
politicians to tax and spend excessively. Such claims, inspired vaguely by
public choice theories of government, have gone largely unchallenged in
Canadian academic literature. Critiques of the prevailing fixation on
deficit and debt reduction certainly exist, but they have not grappled
with the specific implications of the move to legislate balanced budgets.
It is tempting to minimize the importance of these new laws, and many
assume they are little more than rhetorical bluster that simply reaffirms
the already dominant fiscal agenda. This article is a response both to the
proponents of balanced budget legislation and to those who would
discount it as mere posturing. I argue that whatever one's fiscal politics,
there are serious drawbacks to entrenching restraint policies in statutory
2 In the 1997 Federal election campaign, the Progressive Conservatives promised to introduce
"[b]alanced budget and taxpayer protection legislation that provides for responsible fiscal
management by the federal government": Designing a Blueprint for Canadians: Guiding Principles
and Policy Priorities of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada (Ottawa: Progressive
Conservative Party, undated) at 7. Similarly, the Reform Party said it would "cap federal spending
and enact balanced budget legislation": A Fresh Start for Canadians (Calgary: Reform Party,
October 1996) at 6 [hereinafter Fresh Start]. See also H.G. Grubel, "Constitutional Limits on
Government Spending Deficits and Levels in Canada" in H.G. Grubel, D.D. Purvis & W.M. Scarth,
eds., Limits to Government Controlling Deficits and Debt in Canada (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute,
1992) 1 [hereinafter Limits to Government].
3 On 4 March 1997 the United States Senate voted 66-34 in favour of the amendment, one
short of the required two-thirds majority: G. Fraser, "Republicans Suffer Stinging Setback" The
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (5 March 1997) All. See also "Pro & Con: Should the Senate Pass a
Balanced Budget Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?" (1997) 76 Cong. Dig. 74. A similar
proposal was defeated in 1995, also by a single Senate vote: see (1995) 74 Cong. Dig. 161. For an
overview of state balanced budget laws see J.M. Poterba, "Balanced Budget Rules and Fiscal Policy:
Evidence from the States" (1995) 48 Nat'l Tax J. 329.
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or constitutional form. The attempt to legislate current notions of fiscal
responsibility, I argue, is most likely to promote policy decisions that are
economically, socially, and democratically unsound for Canada.
Part II maps out just what the new statutes provide, emphasizing
how they break with traditional budgeting practices, and highlighting the
surprising range of approaches adopted across the country. I suggest
this interjurisdictional diversity reflects an important degree of
continuing dissension about the proper goals of fiscal policy, and more
basically about the role of government in social and economic affairs. In
Part III, I link the design differences among balanced budget laws to an
ongoing contest between neoliberal and welfare liberal images of the
state. Despite its anti-state connotation, I argue, this new wave of
legislation invites renewed discussion of the mutually constitutive
relationship between states and markets in Canadian society.
With this framework in mind, Part IV goes on to discuss three
major types of problems or dangers raised by the recent crop of balanced
budget laws, especially, but not only, by the more extreme versions in
some provinces. I first consider the economic impact of balanced budget
laws, and review the concerns flagged by many commentators that overly
rigid constraints on borrowing can be inefficient and destabilizing if they
inhibit government spending just when it is most needed to offset
recessionary trends in the private sector. This literature challenges the
simplistic notion that a zero deficit policy is inevitably beneficial to the
economy, and reminds us of the close interdependence between public
spending and a flourishing private market. The article then turns to
problems of social justice. I argue that balanced budget laws are likely
to exacerbate social and economic disparities and to heighten barriers to
equality-seeking public initiatives. This danger derives both from the
instrumental rigours of the legislation and from its more subtle
discursive effects. As coercive instruments, fiscal limitation laws will
increase the pressure on governments to move further in the direction of
regressive tax and expenditure measures, particularly during future
recessions. This instrumental capacity derives in part from the
coherence of balanced budget legislation with dominant ideological
discourses. The legislation is backed by and contributes to a larger
discourse of restructuring that promotes a reduced role for government
in meeting basic human needs, and constructs class, gender, racial and
other forms of inequality as matters of individual, private responsibility.
Finally, I consider implications for democratic governance. Fiscal
limitation laws are frequently presented as tools to render the public
sector more accountable. I argue to the contrary that their
overwhelming thrust is to discourage informed debate about where
[VOL. 34 No. 4
Balanced Budget Laws
deficit reduction should rank in the policy agenda, how it should be
achieved, and who will bear the cost. The need to democratize
economic policymaking is clear; however the democratic promise of
balanced budget laws is a false one. By installing deficit and debt
elimination as self-evidently more important than any other
governmental objective, they promise instead to diminish political
dialogue about what goals we want our elected representatives to
pursue.
In Part V, I weigh the combined significance of these drawbacks,
and conclude that the most extreme forms of balanced budget legislation
presently in force in Canada are ill-conceived and .should be rejected out
of hand. I also caution against uncritical acceptance of the apparently
"kinder, gentler" versions enacted in some provinces. Though posing
fewer immediate dangers, they too fall into the trap of constructing
government as excessively large and interventionist, and as harmful to
the common interest. In this sense, all the current laws tend to reinforce
the false necessity of sacrificing social spending to debt control, and help
to pre-empt discussion of other possible choices. There is a pressing
need to interrogate the prevailing notion of fiscal responsibility itself,
and to challenge the idea that a conventional balance sheet can
adequately capture the role of government in our society or properly
measure its success.
II. A TAXONOMY OF CANADIAN BALANCED BUDGET
LEGISLATION
This article uses the terms "balanced budget law" and "fiscal
limitation law" interchangeably to refer to a variety of different legal
limits on the fiscal policy-making powers of government. A balanced
budget in the most conventional sense is achieved when revenues meet
or exceed expenditures for a given year, so that government incurs no
annual deficit. However the legislation reviewed in this article speaks to
many different aspects of fiscal policy besides the narrow issue of annual
deficits. As the central vehicle for expressing a government's fiscal
policy, budgets project the level of public expenditure for the coming
year as well as the mixture of taxation, borrowing and other revenue
measures that will be used to finance those expenditures. 4 Thus, a
balanced budget law, broadly defined, might attempt to restrain
4 See "fiscal policy" in J. McMenemy, The Language of Canadian Politics: A Guide to Important
Terms and Concepts, rev. ed. (waterloo, Ont.: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1995) at 113.
1996]
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government with respect to any or all of the following: spending levels;
the level or mode of taxation; whether or when it can incur deficits; the
use of budgetary surpluses; and/or the repayment of public debt. One
purpose of this article is to draw attention to the striking contrasts
among different forms of balanced budget legislation across the country.
A brief legislative history is useful by way of introduction, to be followed
later by a more thorough exposition of important details.
The first Canadian balanced budget law was enacted in 1991,
when British Columbia's Social Credit government introduced the
Taxpayer Protection Act,S only to see it repealed the following year after
the New Democratic Party (NDP) came to power in the province.
6
Basically, the statute prohibited the provincial government from raising
tax rates, and required that total revenues meet or exceed total
expenditures computed over a five year period.
Following the short-lived British Columbia experiment, several
other Canadian jurisdictions entered the field. In 1992 the federal and
Alberta governments each adopted a Spending ControlAct7 that placed
limits on program spending. Nova Scotia followed a similar path in 1993
with its Expenditure ControlAct.8 Unlike the British Columbia law, these
statutes did not call on government to balance expenditures with
revenues; they simply capped either spending or spending growth. The
federal Act expired at the end of its five year horizon and was not
renewed, whereas Alberta's Spending Control Act was quickly
superceded by more aggressive provincial laws that purport to ban
deficit financing in the province altogether. 9 Nova Scotia's Act remains
in force, and is the sole surviving example of spending control legislation
in the country.10 Several more jurisdictions have joined the legislative
bandwagon since 1993, but all have opted for a full fledged deficit
elimination law, rather than just a spending cap.
5 S.B.C. 1991, c. 6.
6 Taxpayer Protection RepealAct, S.B.C. 1992, c. 23.
7 Spending ControlAct, S.C. 1992, c. 19; and Spending Control Act, S.A. 1992, c. S-21.7.
8 S.N.S. 1993, c. 4.
9 Deficit Elimination Act, S.A. 1993, c. D-6.5, followed by the Balanced Budget and Debt
Retirement Act, S.A. 1995, c. B-0.5 [hereinafter Alberta Act].
10 See Part II(B)(1), below, for further discussion.
[VOL. 34 No. 4
Balanced Budget Laws
Anti-deficit laws of various forms have now been adopted by the
Northwest Territories,1 1 Alberta,12 Saskatchewan,l 3 Manitoba,14
Quebec1 s and New Brunswick.1 6  Two of these-Alberta and
Manitoba-have also introduced tax referendum laws, and British
Columbia has recently enacted a new tax freezej 7
Canadian balanced budget laws share a common theme of
restraining fiscal choices, but vary widely in the nature and severity of
the limits they impose on governments. The main differences are
explicated below.18 Before turning to the legislative details, however, it
is important to consider how the advent of balanced budget laws breaks
with historical conventions of fiscal policymaking, and why this is an
important departure in our governmental system.
A. Altering the Fiscal Firmament: The Decline of Executive Responsibility
The political triumph of fiscal conservatism has been resounding,
and this may help to account for the dearth of critical analysis attending
the rise of balanced budget legislation. To many observers, the
expression of these fiscal politics in statutory form may seem largely
redundant. I argue, to the contrary, that it represents an important shift
in the fiscal firmament. The nature of this shift becomes perceptible
when balanced budget requirements are juxtaposed against the
constitutional, legal and political framework that historically has
governed fiscal policymaking in Canada. The new laws attempt to move
power and responsibility for fiscal decisions farther away from the
elected government of the day, thereby altering a key aspect of the
11 Deficit Elimination Act, S.N.W.T. 1995, c. 22 [hereinafter Northwest Territories Act].
12 Alberta Act, supra note 9.
13 Balanced BudgetAct, S.S. 1995, c. B-0.01 [hereinafter Saskatchewan Act].
14 The Balanced Budget, Debt Repayment and Taxpayer Protection and Consequential
Amendments Act, S.M. 1995, c. 7 [hereinafter Manitoba Act].
15 An Act Respecting the Elimination of the Deficit and a Balanced Budget, S.Q. 1996, c. 55
[hereinafter Quebec Act].
16 Balanced Budget Act, S.N.B. 1993, c. B-0.1, as am. by S.N.B. 1995, c. 23 [hereinafter New
Brunswick Act].
17 Manitoba's tax referendum requirement is part of the Manitoba Act, supra note 14. See
also the Alberta Taxpayer Protection Act, S.A. 1995, c. A-37.8. In British Columbia, see the Tax and
Consumer Rate FreezeAct, S.B.C. 1996, c. 17. See Part II(B)(5), below, for discussion.
18 See Part II(B), below, for discussion.
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relationship among executive, legislative, and judicial branches of
government.
Both federally and provincially, Canada has adhered strongly to
the principle of executive responsibility for fiscal policy choices. The
annual budget is seen as a priority-setting exercise of fundamental
importance for the government of the day, and a critical instrument for
responding to political and economic conditions as they develop.1 9
Thus, the cabinet, particularly the finance minister and the prime
minister or premier, plays an especially hands-on role in decisions about
expenditure levels and priorities, and about the financing of
expenditures through taxation or borrowing. Bargaining takes place
among those ministers who tend to act as guardians of the treasury
(primarily the finance minister and head of the treasury board), and
those who hold spender portfolios. 20 The final budget proposals are
crafted in great secrecy by the finance minister and his or her senior
advisors, subject to the prime minister or premier's agreement.
Though ultimately subject to legislative approval, fiscal decisions
have been regarded as a defining feature of a government's political
program, and are closely linked to executive prerogative. Under the
federal Constitution, money bills can be initiated only in the House of
Commons and cannot be adopted without the recommendation of the
Crown.21 The effect is largely to restrict tax and appropriations
measures to government, and to limit severely the ability of private
members or senators to introduce or amend such legislation.2 2 A
government's budget proposals are seldom altered after tabling in the
legislature. Speaking to an American audience, federal Finance
Minister Paul Martin boasted that "one of the advantages of Canada's
parliamentary system ... is that the budget that is announced is also the
budget that is enacted (provided the government holds a majority of
19 On federal and provincial budgeting processes, see G.B. Doern, A.M. Maslove & M.J.
Prince, Public Budgeting in Canada: Politics, Economics and Management (Ottawa: Carleton
University Press, 1991) [hereinafter Public Budgeting] especially c. 2 and 6; and A.M. Maslove, M.J.
Prince & G.B. Doern, Federal and Provincial Budgeting (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1986).
20 See D.J. Savoie, The Politics of Public Spending in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1990).
21 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, ss. 53 and 54.
22 For a detailed discussion of these limitations and the uncertainty surrounding their precise
scope, see J. Small, "Money Bills and the Use of the Royal Recommendation in Canada: Practice
versus Principle?" (1995) 27 Ottawa L Rev. 35.
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seats in the House of Commons)." 23 Indeed the defeat of a motion to
approve the budget is conventionally regarded as a clear vote of non-
confidence in the government of the day.24 Though recent years have
seen governments accede somewhat to pressures for more public pre-
budget consultations, the Cabinet still functions as the real "political
crucible"25 with final authority for fiscal decisions.
The very concept of balanced budget legislation strikes directly
at this principle of executive responsibility. For the legislature to draw
explicit boundaries around the cabinet's budgetary domain represents a
notable shift in the distribution of powers within our system of
constitutional government. It means that the elected government's
range of policy choices is circumscribed by prior action of the legislative
branch, as well as by the judiciary's authority to interpret and apply those
statutory limits.
One might question the importance of this shift in a
parliamentary system where the executive government generally controls
the legislative branch in any event. After all, balanced budget laws have
not been initiated by opposition or backbench legislators in reaction to
cabinet policies, but have been self-imposed by governments eager to
display their commitment to fiscal prudence. In fact, American
commentators have questioned why Canadians would bother imposing
fiscal limitation laws given our highly centralized budgeting processes.
Unlike the American case, where the budget is vulnerable to conflicts
among Congressional interests, a Canadian majority government, in
theory, should be able to control its own fiscal policy as easily as it can
enact or repeal a balanced budget law.26 This point also hints at a
certain skepticism about the practical significance of such laws in
Canada, since governments could always move for amendment or repeal
should the legal limits prove inconvenient. An even more cynical view is
23 Paul Martin, Minister of Finance, "Symposium on Budget Deficits and Debt: Issues and
Options" (Address to the Fed. Res. Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyo., 1 September 1995)
[unpublished].
24 See N. Ward, Dawson's The Government of Canada, 6th ed. (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1987) at 145.
2 5 Public Budgeting, supra note 19 at 44. See also G.B. Doern, "Fairness, Budget Secrecy, and
Pre-Budget Consultation in Ontario, 1985-1992" in A.M. Maslove, ed., Taxing and Spending: Issues
of Process (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 3.
26 See Canada, House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing
Committee on Finance, Respecting: Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), consideration of the proposed
Spending Control Act Including the Sixth Report to the House, 3d Sess., 34th Pad., 1991 (Chair: M.
Dorin) Issue No. 26 (26 November 1991) at 26:7 [hereinafter Report of the Standing Committee on
Finance].
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that the laws will simply be ignored by governments that find reason to
spend or borrow beyond the statutory limits. It is important to respond
to these points because they are commonly offered as reasons to dismiss
the advent of balanced budget legislation as a fashionable but rather
trivial trend. In my view, this underestimates the politico-legal impact of
statutory rules on executive decisionmaking.
In place of wide-ranging discretion, balanced budget laws
substitute a new and less fluid set of parameters within which fiscal
choices must be made by the finance minister. A spending decision that
previously required a simple shift in cabinet policy now may be
conditioned upon amendments to, or questionable interpretations of,
statutory rules. Though, in principle, a majority government can always
force passage of amendments, legislative action of any kind requires a
relatively major commitment of time, energy and other political
resources. It is a slower and more methodical process than executive
decisionmaking, and cannot respond as quickly to changing economic
conditions or social needs. While the legislation may not be cast in
stone, it certainly diminishes the traditional flexibility of budgetary
policy. Moreover, there is no question that balanced budget laws are
enforceable through the courts to the same extent as any other law. One
of the central rationales for having an independent judicial branch is
precisely to subject executive office holders to the laws enacted by
Parliament. The fact that governments control the means of coercing
compliance does not mean they are entitled to ignore judicial orders.
Nor does the practical reality of limited access to the courts mean that
governments will feel free to flout the law. It is entirely conceivable that
an organized interest group, dedicated to promoting smaller government
and lower taxes, could seek standing to challenge the legality of a
government's budget. In practice, though, governments usually attempt
to comply with their legal obligations on their own initiative, to satisfy
cultural expectations of democratic responsibility and to avoid the
political costs of open noncompliance? 7
The political enforceability of balanced budget laws is sufficient
in itself to have a real impact on fiscal decisions. Such laws may well be
intended as political puffery, but they are effective as such precisely
because they invoke the rule of law to signal the government's
commitment. In the words of one financial commentator, the legislation
"does not necessarily guarantee that the stated targets will be met, [but]
it does provide an indication that the political will exists to achieve these
2 7 See Grubel, supra note 2 at 39.
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objectives."28 Because they raise *these kinds of expectations, such laws
"will make it politically more difficult for a future government to choose
a deficit strategy in its budget making."29 Alberta Premier Ralph Klein
has acknowledged this was a central reason for putting his government's
fiscal plan into legislative form, stating that "[w]e're making it as difficult
as possible for another administration, whether it's Conservative or
Liberal, to change our reforms." 30 This attitude contrasts starkly with
the conventional view that fiscal policy decisions should be left open to
the elected government of the day.
Amendment, repeal, or outright flouting of the law are, of
course, always possible. The history of British Columbia's Taxpayer
Protection Act3l provides a good example. Enacted by the Social Credit
government in 1991, the law was repealed shortly after the election of a
NDP government the same year. However it was relatively easy in the
circumstances to present this as a principled move by a new government
that had been harshly critical of the legislation while in opposition. A
government that had enacted such a law itself, or that was already in
budgetary trouble of its own making, would encounter far more difficulty
in justifying a repeal. Short of a sea change in the political environment,
amendment or repeal is likely to be seen as a last resort. Rather than
risking political backlash, governments will most often simply internalize
the legal constraints in formulating their policy options.
The idea of limiting executive dominance over fiscal policy is not
immediately unattractive from a democratic point of view. The
traditional budget process has rightly been criticized for its lack of
transparency, and for the unequal access that different groups have to
key decisionmakers. The disproportionate influence of business sector
representatives, including tax lawyers and accountants, and the historical
attentiveness of Finance Department officials to the concerns of these
groups, has been well documented3 2 Indeed, Robert Young has argued
28 Toronto Dominion Bank, Department of Economic Research, Report on Provincial
Government Finances (Toronto: Toronto Dominion Bank, August 1995) at 1. Available on the
Internet at http://www.tdbank.ca/tdbankilibrary/provincialloverview.html.
2 9 A.M. Maslove & K.D. Moore, "Provincial Budgeting" in C. Dunn, ed., Provinces: Canadian
Provincial Politics (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 1996) 321 at 348.
30 D. Jenish, Money to Burn: Trudeau, Mulroney and the Bankruptcy of Canada (Toronto:
Stoddart Publishing, 1996) at 216.
31 Supra note 5.
32 See, for example, L.T. MacDonald, Taxing Comprehensive Income: Power and Participation
in Canadian Politics, 1962-1972 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Carleton University, 1985) [unpublished]; and
R. Young, "Business and Budgeting: Recent Proposals for Reforming the Revenue Budgetary
1996]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
that the best possible fiscal policy process for business is one that
consolidates power in the hands of Finance, the historical champion of
pro-capital policies inside government, rather than one that opens
budget proposals to extensive scrutiny or debate, by legislative
committees, for example. 33 Balanced budget laws are sometimes
defended as a means of subjecting fiscal policy to more democratic
control. However, in Part III, below, I argue that balanced budget
legislation offers little prospect of enhancing executive accountability to
those citizens who have been most thoroughly shut out of the fiscal
policy process. If anything, they are likely to heighten government's
sensitivity to those voices that are already powerful.
I have argued here that balanced budget legislation can
potentially influence the course of fiscal policy by delimiting the possible
outcomes of executive judgement. However the nature and degree of
this impact will depend in part on how the laws are drafted, and this may
vary across jurisdictions. I turn now to a more detailed review of the
legislative provisions enacted in Canada to date.
B. Comparative Review of the Legislation:
Diversity Within a Common Frame
The disparate details of Canadian balanced budget legislation
can be grouped under several recurring policy elements or themes. In
different permutations, each of the laws addresses one or more of the
following: (1) spending control; (2) deficit control; (3) enforcement; (4)
debt management; (5) tax limitation; (6) financial disclosure; and (7)
entrenchment. The treatment of each of these policy elements in the
various statutes is examined below. The purpose of this taxonomy is not
only descriptive but also comparative. Despite the current monotony of
political rhetoric about deficit and debt reduction, it shows there is still a
range of disagreement about how governments should go about
implementing the restraint agenda, about the importance of zero deficits
relative to other priorities and needs, and about the degree of latitude
that elected governments should have to determine the course of fiscal
policy. This in turn suggests some important divergences in underlying
visions of the state, also explored below.
Process" (1983) 9 Can. Pub. Pol. 347.
33 Young, supra note 32 at 357. See also Doern, supra note 25 at 25.
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1. Spending control
When fiscal limitation laws first surfaced in Canada in the early
1990s, the most popular approach was not to target deficits per se, but
simply to cap the spending side of government budgets3 4 This was the
model adopted by the federal government, as well as Alberta and Nova
Scotia.35 The federal and Alberta statutes limited the annual growth of
expenditures, 36 whereas Nova Scotia's went further, requiring absolute
reductions in spending in each of four successive fiscal years.37
This model's most striking aspect is that it does not prohibit
deficits in any way. Certainly it curtails one part of the budget, but it
does not require the overall budget to be balanced. So long as spending
stays under the cap, a government may finance this level of expenditure
however it likes. It may raise revenue through taxes or other means, or
it may borrow to finance a deficit.
Also significant is that not all forms of spending are covered.
None of these statutes has attempted to limit the amount spent on
interest payments to service accumulated debt.38 There are other
exceptions as well. Alberta, for example, defined program spending to
exclude payments on government guarantees, as well as expenditures
authorized by special statute.39 Nova Scotia leaves out election expenses
and "Government restructuring costs."40 Federally, expenditures under
34 An early (but short lived) exception was the British Columbia statute, which attempted to
control deficits directly: see supra note 5; and Part II(B)(2), below, for discussion.
35 Supra note 7 and 8.
36 The federal Spending ControlAct, supra note 7, placed dollar limits on program spending
(encompassing both operating and capital expenditures) for five successive fiscal years, effectively
restricting increases to less than 4 per cent per annum. Alberta's Spending ControlAct, supra note 7,
imposed a diminishing cap on percentage increases in program spending (operating and capital),
declining from 2.5 per cent to 2 per cent over three years.
37 The Nova Scotia Expenditure ControlAct, supra note 8, requires operating expenditures to
decline by 3 per cent in each of the 1994-95 and 1995-96 fiscal years, and by 2 per cent in 1996-97
and 1997-98. Capital spending is to decline by 5 per cent in each of these four years: ss. 5, 6. A 1
per cent margin of error is allowed in any one year, provided it is recouped the very next year: ss. 7,
8.
38 The main argument for excluding debt servicing costs is that they depend on interest rates
which are beyond the government's control. However, some argue that these costs should be
included anyway, since they are an important factor in the overall budget picture: see Report of the
Standing Committee on Finance, supra note 26 at 17-18.
3 9 Supra note 7, s. 1(d). The latter exception is for appropriations "pursuant to a statute that
is not an Act for general supply."
40 Supra note 8, s. 3(b).
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the self-financing unemployment insurance system were not counted,
nor were expenditures due to a defined emergency.41 No matter how
well justified in policy terms, provisos such as these may encourage
attempts to allocate spending items to exempt categories either through
creative interpretation of the law, or by preferring these types of
spending over other possible instruments when new needs arise.42
Another possible means of circumventing spending limits is
simply to deliver benefits or subsidies through the tax system, by granting
new deductions, credits, or other forms of targeted tax relief. The cost
of such tax expenditures is reflected only in a lower figure on the
revenue side of the budget, and is not accounted for as direct program
spending.43 They are often criticized as a form of invisible spending,
frequently dispensed to more affluent sectors whose claims for public
subsidization may not attract much sympathy among the wider body of
voters.4 4  Indeed, one commentator has argued that business
constituencies should hesitate before calling for greater transparency in
the tax policy process, because it is precisely the low visibility of tax
expenditures that has made them such a useful means for sympathetic
cabinet members to circumvent general restraint programs since the late
1970s.45 Nor can the total cost of tax concessions be easily predicted or
controlled; they are open-ended subsidy programs without a
predetermined budget limit. The proliferation of tax expenditures, many
directed to the business sector, has been identified as an important
contributor to the surge of deficits and debt in recent decades.46
41 Supra note 7, s. 2.
42 See Report of the Standing Committee on Finance, supra note 26 at 4,5, 11, 20 and 21.
43 The classic work on tax expenditure theory is S.S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The
Concept of Tax Expenditures (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973). For a briefer
discussion, see S.S. Surrey, "Tax Expenditure Analysis: The Concept and Its Uses" (1979) 1.2 Can.
Tax'n 3. The federal government now releases data about the estimated cost of tax expenditures,
but this information is not reflected on the expenditure side of the formal budget: see, for example,
Government of Canada Tax Expenditures (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1996).
44 See Public Budgeting, supra note 19 at 38 and 59-61. See also E.A. Lindquist, "Improving
the Scrutiny of Tax Expenditures in Ontario: Comparative Perspectives and Recommendations" in
Maslove, ed., supra note 25, 32. For a recent study on the distributive effects of personal tax
expenditures, see F. St. Hilaire, For Whom the Tax Breaks, vol. 2.2 (Montreal: Institute for Research
on Public Policy, 1996).
45 Young, supra note 32 at 352.
46 See I. Bakker, "The Politics of Scarcity: Deficits and the Debt" in M.S. Whittington & G.
Williams, eds., Canadian Politics in the 1990s, 4th ed. (Scarborough, Ont.: Nelson Canada, 1995) 55
at 73-76 [hereinafter "Politics of Scarcity"]; I.W. Gillespie, Tax, Borrow and Spend: Financing
Federal Spending in Canada, 1867-1990 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991); and D. Wolfe,
"The Politics of the Deficit" in G.B. Doem, ed., The Politics of Economic Policy (Toronto:
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Despite recommendations from a parliamentary committee to
close the "tax expenditure loophole,"47 no such amendments were made
to the federal legislation. The Nova Scotia spending control law is
equally vulnerable to this problem, potentially creating an incentive to
satisfy particular constituencies with tax relief while shifting the burden
of fiscal restraint onto those groups with less voice in the formation of
tax policy. Interestingly, Alberta did attempt to bring tax expenditures
under the purview of its spending cap, by providing that the cost of any
new programs delivered in the form of tax relief would automatically
lower the ceiling on direct spending.48 However, this provision was
quickly rendered obsolete, as Alberta graduated to a more aggressive
form of balanced budget law aimed at eliminating deficits entirely.
The Nova Scotia Act is today the only surviving example of
spending control legislation in Canada. The federal Act reached the end
of its five year span and was not renewed. At that point, the government
had actually underspent its limit by more than twenty billion dollars as a
consequence of major cuts introduced by the Liberal government in its
first three budgets. 49 Declaring that "extension of this Act is clearly not
required to demonstrate control over government spending,"o the 1996
budget marked an end to federal involvement with balanced budget
legislation, at least for the time being.
The apparent laxity of the federal spending cap should not
necessarily be taken as evidence that spending controls are ineffectual as
a means of forcing fiscal restraint. Obviously, this is a function of the
severity of the limits, rather than some inherent feature of the model
itself. Indeed, some American proponents of fiscal limitation laws argue
that spending controls are a superior instrument if one's goal is to
reduce the overall size of the public sector.S1 A balanced budget
University of Toronto Press, 1985). See also J. Cronin & T. Radke, "The Old and the New Politics
of Taxation: Thatcher and Reagan in Historical Perspective" (1987) Socialist Reg. 263.
4 7 Report of the Standing Committee on Finance, supra note 26 at 22 and 25.
48 Supra note 7, s. 3(5). A "tax expenditure" was defined broadly as "a reduction in money
otherwise payable to the Crown in right of Alberta that funds, in whole or in part, a program,
service or benefit": s. 1(e).
49 Canada, Department of Finance, Budget Plan: supplementary information and notices of
Ways and Means Motions/ tabled in the House of Commons by the Honourable Paul Martin, Minister of
Finance (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 6 March 1996) Table A4.1 at 136.
50 Ibid at 137.
51 See T. King-Meadows & D. Lowery, "The Impact of the Tax Revolt Era State Fiscal Caps:
A Research Update" (1996) 16 Pub. Bud. Fin. 102 at 102-103; and A. Wildavsky, How To Limit
Government Spending (California: University of California Press, 1980) at 12-14. Evidence on the
effectiveness of American tax and expenditure limitations is mixed. One recent study concluded
they have had virtually no effect in containing the size of government budgets: D.G. Bails, "The
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requirement, by contrast, allows spending to grow indefinitely so long as
it is financed by new revenues. Nor should one discount the potential
political and discursive impact of a spending control law in terms of how
it may shape governmental priorities, the choice of policy instruments to
effect those priorities, and the criteria that are used to assess a
government's success or failure. As discussed in Part III, below, these
concerns about the production of public agendas are as relevant to
spending limitations as they are to the anti-deficit laws that have
succeeded them.
2. Deficit control
Early attempts to regulate the spending side of government
accounts have given way to a new generation of laws aimed directly at
the goal of a balanced budget. While Nova Scotia has stuck by its
spending cap, the approach adopted by the Northwest Territories,
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Quebec, and New Brunswick focuses
instead on restricting or eliminating budget deficits.5 2 In effect, anti-
deficit laws attempt to limit government's ability to finance expenditures
by borrowing. What they can legally spend over a given period is thus
made contingent on how much they can raise via taxes, user fees,
privatizations, or other revenue-generating measures.
The anti-deficit theme is pervasive in balanced budget legislation
and certainly forms its symbolic centrepiece across the country (save for
Nova Scotia). But a close comparison reveals that not all anti-deficit
provisions are equally onerous or unflinchingly mandatory. Three major
lines of difference can be identified: (a) is budget balance measured on
an annual or multi-year cycle?; (b) what portions of government
spending and revenues are counted in determining if there is a deficit?;
and (c) can borrowing be resorted to in the event of recessions or other
contingencies? Each of these features is examined in more detail below.
It is quickly apparent that, on all counts, Alberta's anti-deficit rules
define the outer limits of severity, with Manitoba not far behind. At the
other end of the spectrum are the more flexible versions of
Effectiveness of Tax-Expenditure Limitations: A Re-evaluation" (1990) 49 Am. J. Econ. & Soc. 223.
Others have found evidence of some effect, usually modest: see H.W. Elder, "Exploring the Tax
Revolt: An Analysis of the Effects of State Tax and Expenditure Limitation Laws" (1992) 20 Pub,
Fin. Q. 47; J.M. Poterba, "State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions
and Politics" (1994) 102 J. Pol. Econ. 799; and C. Sherwood-Call, "Tax Revolt or Tax Reform? The
Effects of Local Government Limitation Measures in California" (1987) 2 Fed. Res. Bank S.F.
Econ. Rev. 57.
5 2 Supra notes 9, 11, and 13-16.
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Saskatchewan and New Brunswick. Quebec and the Northwest
Territories fall somewhere in between.
a) Annual versus multi-year balancing
All Canadian governments budget on an annual cycle. That is, a
proposed budget is tabled in advance of each fiscal year, accompanied by
the government's prospective estimates of spending and revenue.
Legislative approval of the budget is followed by a series of supply votes
to authorize the appropriation of funds for public expenditure. When
spending requirements exceed available revenues, the government
typically goes into financial markets and borrows to finance the deficit.5 3
Anti-deficit provisions, however, aim to preclude or restrict this ability to
borrow.
Alberta has the most unforgiving anti-deficit rule in the country.
The Balanced Budget and Debt Retirement Act provides that
"[e]xpenditures during a fiscal year must not be more than revenue." 54
The government is thus required to balance every annual budget. In
principle, this amounts to a complete ban on deficits and removes
borrowing from the means available to government to finance its
activities. No other province quite matches Alberta's dogged insistence
upon annual balance. The closest comparators are Manitoba, the
Northwest Territories, and Quebec, all of which impose some form of
modified annual-balance requirement.
Manitoba begins with an absolute rule that "the government is
not to incur a deficit,"S and adds that if a deficit is incurred, it must be
offset by an equivalent surplus the very next fiscal year.5 6 Notably,
Manitoba has created a Fiscal Stabilization Fund that can be used to top
up revenues in recessionary years.5 7 The creation of this fund
53 Procedures for authorizing and monitoring government spending and borrowing are set out
in federal and provincial Financial Administration Acts. See, for example, FinancialAdministration
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-11.
54 Supra note 9, s. 2: applicable to 1997-98 and subsequent fiscal years. A zero deficit was also
required in 1996-97 pursuant to a predecessor statute, the Deficit Elimination Act, supra note 9, s. 2,
which mandated declining deficits commencing in the 1993-94 fiscal year.
55 Manitoba Act, supra note 14, s. 2: applicable to 1995-96 and subsequent fiscal years.
56Ibid., s. 4(1). My reading is that this section does not retroactively legalize a deficit, even if
it is recouped the following year, but is an additional requirement that arises whenever the zero
deficit rule is breached. See the discussion of Manitoba's enforcement provisions, in Part II(B)(3),
below.
5 7 The Fiscal Stabilization Fund Act, S.M. 1989-90, c. 16.
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acknowledges implicitly that it may be impossible to balance the budget
within every single year, and that surplus revenues from strong years may
be needed to finance deficits in weaker years.58
The Northwest Territories Act calls for budgets to be balanced
over a two year cycle at most, limiting any annual deficits to no more
than 1 per cent of revenues, which must be made up with a surplus in the
following year.59 No deficit is allowed under any circumstances in
1998-99, after which the Territories are to be partitioned to create
Nunavut and the Western Territory.60 The statute's preamble expresses
concern that "it will be necessary to divide the assets and liabilities of the
Northwest Territories in a fair and equitable manner," and a wish to
ensure that "no significant financial burden encumbers either the
Nunavut Territory or the new Western Territory."6 1 In light of the
unique political context addressed by this law, it is not likely sufficient to
assess the Northwest Territories legislation according to the same
criteria as the provinces. 62 Nonetheless, the potential problems
associated with balanced budget legislation likely have some relevance to
the Territories, particularly if the law is retained following partition.
Quebec's law schedules the gradual elimination of its budget
deficit over a period of years, and provides that "[n]o deficit shall be
incurred from the fiscal year 1999-2000 onward." 63 As in Manitoba, any
shortfall in one year must be offset by an equivalent surplus in the next
fiscal year, but Quebec limits this proviso to shortfalls of less than one
billion dollars.64 Larger deficits, which are permitted in the event of
certain contingencies, are subject to a complicated five-year
management scheme. 65
58 Section 9 of the Manitoba Act, supra note 14, requires any budget surplus in a particular
year to be devoted first to bringing the Fiscal Stabilization Fund up to its target level of 5 per cent of
expenditures.
59 Northwest Territories Act, supra note 11, ss. 2,3.
60 Ibid., preamble, s. 3(3).
6 1 IbiL, preamble.
62 For an overview of the Nunavut settlement and the financial and other aspects of
implementation, see K. Cameron & G. White, Northern Governments in Transition: Political and
Constitutional Development in the Yukon, Nunavut and the Western Northwest Territories (Montreal:
Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1995) c. 4.
63 Quebec Act, supra note 15, s. 6.
64 Ibid., s. 8.
65 See Part II(B)(2)(c), below, for further discussion.
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All of these requirements for annual or modified annual balance
can be contrasted with the approach taken in Saskatchewan and New
Brunswick, where budgetary balance is measured over a multi-year cycle.
Saskatchewan's Balanced Budget Act calls on the government to create a
four-year financial plan after every election, and provides that "the total
expenses for the four fiscal years must balance with or be less than the
total revenues for the same four fiscal years." 66 Under this model the
government continues to prepare a budget for each fiscal year and may
run a deficit in any particular budget, provided overall balance is
achieved over the four years. 67 Similarly, New Brunswick's Balanced
Budget Act aims to have revenues meet expenditures over every four-
year "fiscal period."68 British Columbia's short-lived Taxpayer Protection
Act established an even longer five-year cycle for measuring fiscal
balance.69 As discussed in Part III, below, the multi-year cycle preserves
greater flexibility for governments in responding to economic and social
conditions, and is likely at least to mitigate some of the dangers of
prohibiting borrowing altogether.
b) Coverage
The statutes are uneven in terms of what revenues and
expenditures are counted in determining whether balance has been
achieved. Certain forms of spending may be explicitly exempted by the
legislation, or may be handled outside the regular budget by convention.
One important area of disagreement is whether the law should cover
capital expenditures, or just current account spending. Unlike private
organizations, Canadian governments traditionally have not separated
these two elements of the budget. Public finance analysts have criticized
this practice, pointing out that capital expenditures represent long-term
investments that normally must be financed by borrowing, and should be
amortized over time for accounting purposes. Lumping in the entire
66 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 13, ss. 3(1), 4(1).
67 In Manitoba, New Democratic Party opposition members held up the Saskatchewan Act,
supra note 13, as a more flexible and prudent model, and proposed an amendment to adopt a
similar four-year budget cycle: Manitoba, Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings, 1st Sess.,
36th Leg., vol. XLV, No. 42 (4 October 1995) at 3651, R. Wowchuk; and No. 57 (27 October 1995)
at 4318, K. Lamoureux.
68 New Brunswick Act, supra note 16, s. 3. The Act provides for a "first fiscal period" lasting
only three years, and then applies to every subsequent four-year period: s. 1.
69 Supra note 5, ss. 8-10.
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cost of a new capital investment with the current operating budget gives
a falsely inflated picture of annual expenditures and deficits.70 The
analogy at the household level would be a requirement that cars, houses,
and post-secondary education be fully paid for in cash in the year they
are purchased. Put another way, there is a difference between
borrowing to finance current consumption of goods and services, and
borrowing to finance capital investments that will produce returns to the
economy over a lengthy period.71
One undesirable side effect of this failure to distinguish capital
and current budgets is that it allows (and perhaps encourages)
governments to dispose of Crown assets to achieve short term, albeit
misleading, improvements in the budgetary picture. Because there is no
separate accounting for the net value of capital assets, the proceeds from
privatizing a public asset can only be reflected as a one time increase in
annual revenues, while the permanent decline in the value of Crown
assets is not reflected anywhere. 72 One member of the legislative
assembly protested this aspect of the Manitoba bill in the following
terms:
a family does not balance its budget by selling its car or selling its house or cashing in its
savings. That is not a balanced budget in any meaningful sense of the word. Any family
who did so would clearly understand that they had sold an asset, that they had not
balanced their budget. They may have met their daily needs for food, but they would
have done so at the risk of impoverishing their future ability to meet those needs.73
Thus, Allan Maslove and Kevin Moore argue that selling off Crown
assets may serve political agendas to reduce or alter the role of
government in society, but "the deficit reduction rationale behind such
moves is weak at best."74
New Brunswick appears to be the only jurisdiction that has
recognized this sensible distinction in crafting its balanced budget law.
The Statute speaks only to "ordinary expenditures" and "ordinary
revenues" of the province,75 leaving room for borrowing to finance
70 See, for example, Public Budgeting, supra note 19 at 125.
71 Maslove & Moore, supra note 29 at 340.
72 Ibid. at 348.
73 Manitoba, Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings, 1st Sess., 36th Leg., vol. XLV,
No. 57 (27 October 1995) at 4321, T. Sale.
74 Supra note 29 at 348.
75 New Brunswick Act, supra note 16, ss. 1, 2.
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capital spending on infrastructure. 76 This is similar to the practice of
several American state governments which apply their balanced budget
requirements only to the operating portions of the budgets. 77
None of the other anti-deficit laws currently in force in Canada
make any distinction between current and capital accounts. This is not
to suggest they necessarily cover all forms of spending or all receipts.
Typically, the statutes provide that "revenues" must meet or exceed
"expenditures," but as with any other law, such terms are open to
interpretation and in particular depend upon the financial accounting
policies adopted by a government. Various items may be segregated
from general revenues in special funds established for particular
programs, attributed to independent agencies, or otherwise treated as
"off budget." One American study described this ambiguity as follows:
The percent of budget and the funds covered by balanced budget requirements are not
fixed. Rather, they representjudgments of state officials and interpretations of generally
worded requirements. For example, New Jersey's requirement does not specify any
particular funds that are covered, but state officials interpret it to cover all funds other
than trust funds. In any state, the creation of new funds ... raises the question of whether
these funds are covered by the balanced budget requirement. That judgment may change
over time.78
In Canada, Alberta's balanced budget law is framed very widely to cover
"expenditures of the Crown for all purposes" and "revenue of the Crown
from all sources," with the Crown defined to include most (but not all)
provincial agencies and corporations.7 9 Saskatchewan's legislation is
narrower, covering only revenues and expenses of the general revenue
fund.80 The point here is simply that the practical impact of a balanced
budget law depends in part upon what financial accounts it is understood
76 For example, the New Brunswick budget, Department of Finance, Budget 1996-1997
(Fredericton: Department of Finance, 15 February 1996) at 10, reported that the government was
on target to achieve cumulative balance in its ordinary accounts over the three year fiscal period
ending in 1995-96, as required by the legislation, and even anticipated a surplus in the order of 158
million dollars. Net capital spending over the period was expected to exceed the surplus and add to
the province's cumulative debt, but this was accounted for separately and did not violate the
balanced budget provision.
77 See National Association of State Budget Officers, State Balanced Budget Requirements:
Provisions and Practice (Washington, D.C.: National Association of State Budget Officers, 24 June
1992) at 2 [hereinafter NASBoI R. Eisner says that "most state governments maintain separate
capital budgets to which the balanced budget provision [in the state Constitution] does not apply":
"The B.B.A.: A Spent Idea" The Nation (24 February 1997) 16 at 18. However, the earlier NASBO
study found that only a minority of states exempted their capital budgets.
78 1bid.
79 Alberta Act, supra note 9, s. 1.
80 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 13, s. 2.
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to encompass, and that this may vary among jurisdictions and over time
in less than fully transparent ways.
c) Contingency clauses
In some statutes, borrowing restrictions are eased in the event of
special circumstances or defined crises. Contingency clauses have been
drafted by some governments to cushion themselves against serious
economic downturns or extraordinary expenses. Predictably, however,
the escape hatches are of varying breadth. The Northwest Territories
has the most open-ended saving clause, allowing the Legislative
Assembly to forgive a deficit if it resulted from "circumstances ... beyond
the reasonable control of the Executive Council."81 In Saskatchewan,
the government's progress in achieving four-year balance is to be
measured without reference to any "major, unanticipated, identifiable
event or set of circumstances" that has a "dramatic impact on expenses
or revenues."8 2 There is no definition of the precise nature or order of
magnitude of the events contemplated, which might be read to
encompass even a modest recession. Quebec permits annual deficits to
exceed one billion dollars if they result from a "disaster," a "significant
deterioration of economic conditions," or a "substantially" reduced
federal transfer payment.83 Manitoba has a more narrowly defined set
of exemptions for deficits arising from a war or a "natural or other
disaster ... that could not have been anticipated and affects the province
... in a manner that is of urgent public concern," or from "a reduction in
revenue of 5 per cent or more."84
Alberta stands out for its lack of any contingency clause. Though
New Brunswick's statute also has no saving provision, its multi-year
period for achieving budget balance arguably serves a similar function.
81 Northwest Territories Act, supra note 11, s. 5(3).
82 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 13, s. 4(2).
83 Quebec Act, supra note 15, s. 10. In such cases, the government must devise a five year plan
for offsetting the deficit.
84 Manitoba Act, supra note 14, s. 3(2). The lieutenant governor in council is empowered to
declare conclusively whether one of these contingencies has occurred: s. 3(3). Presumably, the flood
of 1997 would qualify.
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3. Enforcement
Balanced budget legislation is enforceable against governments
in the same manner as other laws: mostly through willing compliance
assisted by political pressure, and ultimately through the courts.85 These
laws are not merely hortatory. Almost always, they use clear mandatory
language such as "[n]o deficit shall be incurred ... ," or expenditures
"must not"8 6 exceed revenue, or government "must balance" 87 the
books. The exception is New Brunswick, where a zero deficit is
prescribed only as "the objective of the Government."88
Two of the statutes also subject cabinet ministers to
extraordinary penalties for non-compliance with anti-deficit rules.
Manitoba imposes an automatic 20 per cent salary reduction on all
cabinet members if the province incurs a deficit in any year, rising to 40
per cent if there is a second consecutive deficit.8 9 In the Northwest
Territories, if deficit restrictions are contravened the Legislative
Assembly must decide whether to recommend dismissal of the Executive
Council, taking into consideration whether there were circumstances
"beyond [its] reasonable control."90 These potential penalties create
very strong incentives for cabinet ministers to impose tough budgetary
measures, not only to avoid embarrassment or loss of power as
government officers, but also to protect their personal interests.
It is also important that all of the anti-deficit provisions appear
to refer to the actual budgetary position of the government, rather than
the budget approved by the legislature in advance of each fiscal year.
The budget document tabled in the legislature is only a prediction of
revenues and expenditures for the coming year, based on economic
forecasting assumptions that rest to some degree on opinion and
judgment. In the United States, most fiscal limitation laws require states
only to balance their proposed budget or the budget approved by the
legislature, rather than balancing the actual budget at year-end.91 By
contrast, the Canadian laws take pains to demand a reconciliation of the
85 See Part 11(A), above, for discussion.
86 Alberta Act, supra note 9, s. 2; and Northwest Territories Act, supra note 11, s. 2.
8 7 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 13, ss. 3-4.
88 New Brunswick Act, supra note 16, s. 2.
89 Manitoba Act, supra note 14, s. 7..
90 Northwest Territories Act, supra note 11, ss. 5(3), 5(4).
91 NASBO, supra note 77 at 1.
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government's budget plan with the actual public accounts for the year.
In the Northwest Territories, for example, the legislature monitors
compliance with the law by examining the public accounts within 180
days after the fiscal year ends.92 Manitoba and Alberta also check the
budget against interim financial reports as the year progresses. 93 Even
in New Brunswick the balanced budget objective is clearly defined by
reference to expenditures and revenues, as reported in the public
accounts. 94 The requirement that actual fiscal performance live up to
budget forecasts makes the laws more rigorous and enforceable, at least
in political terms, and leaves little room for governments to rely on
differences of opinion about economic prospects for the upcoming year.
4. Debt management
Alberta and Manitoba not only ban deficits prospectively, but
also provide for the retirement of old debts accumulated from budget
shortfalls of past years. Both have enacted detailed timetables for the
repayment of outstanding debt.95 Perhaps more importantly, both have
placed restrictions on the use of future budget surpluses. In Alberta, any
surplus, no matter how large, must be applied to reduce the debt.96
Thus, a predicted $2.2 billion surplus for the 1996-97 fiscal year will be
dedicated entirely to debt reduction, and none will be used to restore
funding to programs or services the province has cut severely in recent
years.97 Manitoba's law is less rigid. Surpluses must be used first to top
up the province's stabilization fund, but can then be kept in the
operating budget or applied to reduce debt at the minister of finance's
discretion.98 The effect of both statutes, however, is to project the fiscal
92 Northwest Territories Act, supra note 11, ss. 4,5.
93 Manitoba Act, supra note 14, ss. 5-7; and Alberta Act, supra note 9, s. 11.
9 4 New Brunswick Act, supra note 16, s. 1.
95 The Alberta Act, supra note 9, s. 4, requires elimination of the debt by 2021-22, but the
province has announced it will accelerate the repayment schedule to 2010: Government of Alberta,
News Release, "Alberta's net debt to be gone in thirteen years" (24 June 1996). The Manitoba Act,
supra note 14, s. 8, has prescribed annual payments to a "Debt Retirement Fund,"that are expected
to eliminate the debt in thirty years: see Guide to the Draft Legislation, available on the Internet at
http://www.gov.mb.ca/manitoba/finance/text/bdatx02.html.
9 6 Alberta Act, supra note 9, s. 6.
9 7D. Henton, "Klein Delivers Albertans News of Budget Surplus" Toronto Star (5 February
1997) All.
98 Manitoba Act, supra note 14, s. 9.
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restraint agenda forward over a long period into the future. Without
saying so explicitly, they entrench debt elimination as the top priority for
many years, taking precedence over state action on any other front.
Saskatchewan has also addressed the need for debt management,
but in a more procedural manner that avoids stating how quickly debt
should be retired or how it should rank relative to other fiscal priorities
of a particular government. The statute obliges every government to
present a four-year debt management plan after its election, but does
not dictate the plan's content in any way.99 The cumulative balance of
surpluses and deficits over time is to be recorded in a debt reduction
account,100 but nothing appears to demand that this account actually be
used to retire outstanding debt. The remaining jurisdictions say nothing
about retirement of debt, and in fact in Quebec, a government that
achieves a surplus is expressly permitted to incur equivalent "overruns"
in subsequent fiscal years.101
5. Tax limitation
Manitoba and Alberta stand out prominently as the only two
provinces that have enacted a tax limitation alongside an anti-deficit law.
This is a combination of enormous significance. Restricting the ability to
generate new revenues through taxation further narrows the range of
fiscal choices open to government, and heightens the pressure for
expenditure cuts to balance the budget. Indeed, Geoffrey Brennan and
James Buchanan argue that tax limitations are almost constitutional in
nature, because they alter so fundamentally "the rules of the politico-
fiscal game." 102
In both provinces, referenda must be held if the government
proposes certain kinds of new tax measures. Manitoba prohibits any
rate increase in the province's four major taxes unless the government
first obtains majority approval in a referendum.10 3 It appears that a
negative referendum vote is intended to bind the government. Alberta's
99 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 13, ss. 3(1), 3(4), 3(5).
100 Ibid., s. 5.
101 Quebec Act, supra note 15, s. 9.
102 G. Brennan & J.M. Buchanan, "The Logic of Tax Limits: Alternative Constitutional
Constraints on the Power to Tax" (1979) 32 Nat'l Tax J. (Supplement) 11.
103 Manitoba Act, supra note 14, s. 10. The taxes covered are the provincial income tax, the
retail sales tax, the health and post secondary education tax and the tax on commercial purchases of
electricity, natural gas, etc. under Part I of the Revenue Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. R150.
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Taxpayer Protection ActlO4 forbids the introduction of a general sales tax
without prior approval by referendum. Unlike the Manitoba law, this
phrasing avoids any formal commitment to obtain majority approval.
However in its 1997 budget, the Alberta government appeared to be
moving further in the direction of Manitoba. It pledged to introduce
more sweeping legislation, "to cap personal and corporate income taxes,
and perhaps other taxes, at current levels-unless and until Albertans
vote to increase taxes through a referendum." 105
It is unclear what effect the tax referendum laws will have on the
level or mix of taxation in these provinces. The use of referenda may be
more flexible than British Columbia's Tax and Consumer Rate FreezeAct,
which bans the government entirely from introducing new taxes or
increasing most existing taxes until the end of the century.1 06 With a
referendum law, voters, in theory, could always approve a tax increase.
However the American experience, albeit from a different context,
suggests that voters tend to support referendum initiatives to reduce
levels of taxation, even when they oppose any reduction in the public
services from which they benefit.1 07 In Part IV, below, I contest the
simplistic assumption that such referenda necessarily promote true
political dialogue or democratic outcomes. I argue instead that tax
limitation laws are more likely to discourage governments from taking
active measures to promote equality, and facilitate the process of
marginalizing as "special interests" those groups most severely harmed
by expenditure restraint.
104 Supra note 17.
105 Alberta, Department of Finance, Budget '97 Post-Election Update: Budget and Business
Plan Documents, Part 2 (Edmonton: Queen's Printer, 1997) at 2- 3. The budget speech also likened
taxation to the beating of slaves (citizens) by a slavemaster (government).
106 Supra note 17. Unlike Alberta and Manitoba, British Columbia is not legally required to
balance its budget. However there is tremendous political pressure on Finance Minister Andrew
Petter to eliminate the deficit. In light of the tax freeze, fiscal policy in British Columbia will likely
be tilted heavily in favour of spending cuts.
107 See, for example, J. Citrin & D.P. Green, "Policy and Opinion in California After
Proposition 13" (1985) 38 Nat'I Tax J. 15; J. Citrin, "Do People Want Something for Nothing: Public
Opinion on Taxes and Government Spending" (1979) 32 Nat'l Tax J. (Supplement) 113; H.F. Ladd
& J. Boatwright Wilson, "Why Voters Support Tax Limitations: Evidence from Massachusetts'
Proposition 2-1/2" (1982) 35 Nat'l Tax J. 121; and R.M. Stein, K.E. Hamm & P.K. Freeman, "An
Analysis of Support for Tax Limitation Referenda" (1983) 40 Pub. Choice 187.
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6. Financial disclosure
It is popular to impose rigorous financial reporting rules in
conjunction with a balanced budget law. Many of the statutes require
periodic special reports and updates on the government's fiscal progress,
and assign responsibility to the traditional guardians of the
treasury-finance ministers, treasury boards, and auditors general-to
audit compliance with the Act. Several statutes also attempt to limit
government's ability to make convenient accounting changes or overly
optimistic economic forecasts. In Saskatchewan, for example, a
significant change in accounting practices may not be used for the
purpose of determining whether a four-year financial plan has been
fulfilled.108 And Alberta imposes a set of conservative assumptions to be
used in forecasting future revenues from natural resources and
corporate income taxes.109 Notably, this is the sole concession in
Alberta's statute to the cyclical variability of economic growth and
revenues.
All of these mechanisms are directed to financial transparency
and all hold out a promise of greater accountability in government, a
theme which also resonates in the provisions for tax referenda and the
sudden enthusiasm for penalizing cabinet ministers. While one hesitates
to criticize any attempt to ensure greater openness in government, it is
important at the same time to assess the nature of the information
provided, and also what is not disclosed. I argue later in this article that,
far from giving us unmediated access to the truth about government
finances, balanced budget laws intensify the production of those types of
information that help to construct a particular version of economic
reality; one in which lower taxes, spending, and deficits are assumed to
promote the interests of all citizens alike.
7. Entrenchment
Like all statutes, balanced budget laws will extend beyond the life
of the governments that introduced them and, unless amended or
repealed, will affect the budgeting practices of future governments. As
noted earlier, however, legislative entrenchment is highly unusual in the
108 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 13, s. 4(3). Similar provisions can be found in the Manitoba
Act, supra note 14, s. 3(6), and the New Brunswick Act, supra note 16, ss. 5-6.
109 Alberta Act, supra note 9, s. 8.
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area of fiscal policy and clashes with strong traditions of executive
prerogative and discretion around the budget.110  Furthermore,
amendment or repeal of these laws, depending on the circumstances,
may have particularly heavy political costs for a government.
In addition to these factors, one province, Manitoba, has
attempted to entrench its balanced budget law more explicitly. The Act
provides that if a different party is elected into power, the new
government is relieved of its obligation to balance the budget, but only
for the fiscal year in which the election is held.111 In addition, Manitoba
requires that any bill to "amend, repeal, override or suspend the
operation of" the statute must be referred to a standing committee for
hearings with at least seven days notice to the public.112 These hurdles,
while not insurmountable, will add to the usual inconvenience and
political risks of amending legislation, or of failing to comply.
III. CONTRASTING IMAGES OF THE STATE: WELFARE
LIBERALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM
The jurisdictional differences highlighted in this article are more
than mere idiosyncratic details; taken together, they suggest that
legislators have been influenced by divergent and ideologically specific
understandings of the state's role in modern society. Balanced budget
laws can be viewed as a new front in an ongoing struggle over modes of
governance, in particular the neoliberal challenge to post-war
conceptions of the liberal welfare state.113 The central precept of
neoliberalism is that market forces are to be preferred over state
regulation as the primary mechanism for allocating resources and
distributing income and wealth. The preference for markets is
110 See Part II(A), above.
111 Manitoba Act, supra note 14, s. 4(2).
112 Ibid., s. 12.
113 I adopt the term "neoliberalism" here because it best captures the market libertarian
thrust of prevailing economic policies that is the central concern of this paper. Others use
"neoconservatism" to describe the same broad trends and in many respects the two terms are
interchangeable, though the latter implies a stronger and more explicit role for the state in
enforcing a conservative social morality, for example by shoring up traditional gender roles and
familial forms: see N. Fraser, "Clintonism, Welfare, and the Antisocial Wage: The Emergence of a
Neoliberal Political Imaginary" (1993) 6 Rethinking Marxism 9 [hereinafter "Clintonism"]; and R.
Grinspun & R. Kreklewich, "Consolidating Neoliberal Reforms: 'Free Trade' as a Conditioning
Framew'ork" (1994) 43 Stud. Pol. Econ. 33 especially note 3. See also S. Gill, "Globalisation,
Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism" (1995) 24 Millenium 399.
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constructed not only as a matter of choice, but as an absolute necessity if
Canada is to thrive in an increasingly global economy. Neoliberalism
asserts that, in order to compete in international markets, domestic
policies must be oriented to reducing government's participation in the
economy and minimizing state regulation of trade, investment and
production.114 The provision of public services is to be privatized
wherever possible, and residual state operations restructured to emulate
private enterprise.115 As the state downsizes and marketizes, there is "a
corresponding expansion of the scope of individual-especially
entrepreneurial-action." 116  The minimalist view of the state is
complemented by a neoliberal image of the consumer-citizen who is
above all self-reliant and responsible to secure her welfare through
market activity and/or the private resources of family, resorting to
government assistance only in the most desperate circumstances.117
Both the normative and the empirical assertions of neoliberalism
have been pilloried by critical scholars. In particular, the claim that
nation state power is only declining in the face of global economic
pressures has been countered with much evidence that governments
remain crucial partners of capital in facilitating a more internationalized
market, and in fact in some areas are intensifying their surveillance and
regulation of citizens to that end.118  The rhetoric of minimal
government rests upon a false dichotomization of state and market that
elides the essential role of local governments in creating the conditions
114 See I. Bakker, "Deconstructing Macro-economics Through a Feminist Lens" in J. Brodie,
ed., Women and Canadian Public Policy (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1996) 31 at 33-36 [hereinafter
Women and Policy]; J. Brodie, Politics on the Margins: Restructuring and the Canadian Women's
Movement (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1995) especially c. 1 and 4 [hereinafter Politics on the
Margins]; and P. Resnick, "The Ideology of Neo-Conservatism" in W. Magnusson et aL, eds., The
New Reality: the Politics of Restraint in British Columbia (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1984) 131.
115 A classic work advocating this type of public sector restructuring is D. Osborne & T.
Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector
(New York: Penguin Books, 1992). For two quite different critical analyses see M. Trebilcock, The
Prospects for Reinventing Government (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1994); and H.W. Arthurs,
'"Mechanical Arts and Merchandise': Canadian Public Administration in the New Economy" (1997)
42 McGill L.J. 29.
116 H.W. Arthurs & R. Kreklewich, "Law, Legal Institutions, and the Legal Profession in the
New Economy" (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall LJ. 1 at 9.
117 See J. Brodie, "Restructuring and the New Citizenship" in I. Bakker, ed., Rethinking
Restructuring: Gender and Change in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) 126
[hereinafter Rethinking Restructuring]. See also Fraser, supra note 113.
118 See S. Sassen, Losing Control?: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996) at 27-30. See also G. Laxer, "Social Solidarity, Democracy and
Global Capitalism" (1995) 32 Can. Rev. Soc. & Anth. 287.
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necessary for internationalized market activity. In fact Nancy Fraser
asserts that, far from removing the state from the private economy, one
of the distinctive features of neoliberalism is the way it "allies
government more directly with capital," 1 9 to deliver marketized versions
of services formerly conceived as public goods. In Alberta, for example,
Claude Denis argues that the state's reach has not been reduced so
much as redirected to the task of acculturating and coercing citizens into
the new economic order, through legislative measures, media campaigns,
and other means.120
Despite its internal contradictions and normative flaws, however,
neoliberal ideology presently exerts a high degree of influence over
policymaking in Canada. The emerging anti-state consensus has
transformative implications for the public sector in general 21 , and for
fiscal policy in particular. Within welfare state liberalism, taxation and
expenditure policy are seen as tools by which an activist state can both
stimulate the private economy and achieve a better distribution of
resources than that accomplished by market forces operating alone.1 22
Both these objectives are regarded skeptically from a neoliberal vantage
point. State intervention in the economy is thought to undermine
market efficiency and hence to destroy longer term productivity.
Freeing up market forces is seen not only as the best economic policy,
but as a fairer and morally better way to provide for human welfare.
Thus neoliberalism has been associated with a strong hostility toward
government spending, taxation and deficits alike, despite the apparent
contradictions of pursuing all of these agendas at oncej 23 Economic
arguments for deficit reduction are often coupled tightly with a
neoliberal ideology. Maslove and Moore take the view that deficit
elimination is in many cases simply "a shorthand or code word for
smaller governments ... and less intervention in private markets." 124
119 "Clintonism", supra note 113 at 15.
120 C. Denis, "'Government Can Do Whatever It Wants': Moral Regulation in Ralph Klein's
Alberta" (1995) 32 Can. Rev. Soc. & Anth. 365. See also M. Kline, "Blue Meanies in Alberta: Tory
Tactics and the Privatization of Child Welfare" in S. Boyd, ed., Challenging the Public/Private Divide:
Feminism, Law and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) [forthcoming].
121 Arthurs, supra note 115 at 46.
122 See Public Budgeting, supra note 19 at 2-4.
123 On the unlikelihood of Ontario balancing its budget while at the same time cutting taxes,
see J.S. Dupr6, "Taming the Monster: Debt, Budgets, and Federal-Provincial Fiscal Relations at the
Fin de Siecle" in Dunn, ed., supra note 29, 379 at 394.
124 Maslove & Moore, supra note 29 at 347.
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Much of the intellectual fuel for neoliberalism's attack on the
fiscal activities of government has been provided by public choice
theories of government. The point of departure for public choice
theorists is that government officials are motivated not by a detached
and selfless desire to serve the larger public interest, but rather seek to
maximize their own self-interest in a manner not unlike private market
actors.125 In the public sphere, self-interest is defined variously in terms
of material gain, electoral success, bureaucratic empire building,
celebrity, or even the moral self-satisfaction of believing one has served
the public. 126 In formulating the budget, government actors are thought
to respond more to these sorts of informal incentives than to any
centrally determined notion of what is in the public interest. On this
basis, public choice analysts argue that representative governments
suffer from an inherent tendency toward bureaucratic expansion and
deficit spending. Politicians respond out of self-interest to the spending
demands of their narrow electoral constituencies, it is argued, and
because the burden of expenditures is spread widely across the general
body of taxpayers, it is seldom cost-efficient to organize any effective
opposition. If programs can be financed with borrowed money, the cost
of government spending is shifted even further to future taxpayers, who
have no voice at all in the current political period. These tendencies are
not attributed to a lack of moral fibre on the part of politicians. Rather,
"[t]he incentives are such as to generate a regime of fiscal deficits as a
necessary consequence of fully rational responses of political agents to
the demands of their constituents." 127 Deficits are thus seen as the
inevitable by-product of an unrestrained political market place.
Public choice theorists are among the strongest advocates of
fiscal limitation laws as a means of remedying this perceived weakness of
representative democracies.1 28  Neither ordinary politics, nor the
disciplining forces of financial markets and credit rating agencies, are
thought to be sufficient counterweights to the incentives in the system
125 See M. Friedman, "Economists and Economic Policy" (1986) 24 Econ. Inquiry 1 at 2. See
also J.M. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1962).
126 See M.J. Trebilcock, et aL, The Choice of Governing Instrument (Ottawa: Minister of
Supply and Services, 1982) c. 2.
127 J.M. Buchanan, "Clarifying Confusion About the Balanced Budget Amendment" (1995)
48 Nat'l Tax J. 347 at 348-349.
128 For a helpful review of the public choice argument in favour of fiscal limitation laws, see
M.G. Wrobel, Fiscal Rules for the Control of Government (Background Paper B-358E) (Ottawa:
Library of Parliament Research Branch, 1993).
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for excessive public spending. Consequently, it is necessary to "chang[e]
institutional arrangements so as to make it in the self-interest of
legislators" 29 to constrain their budgets. A legal or constitutional
requirement to cap spending or balance the budget ties the hands of
government officials and gives them a means of resisting calls for new
programs. The object of such formal constraints is to deflect spending
pressure away from politicians and to "pit one special interest group
against another" 30 by forcing them to compete for a legally limited pool
of resources.
In adopting balanced budget laws, Canadian governments have
embraced the idea that fiscal policymakers ought to be externally
constrained by rules. This legislative trend no doubt draws some of its
inspiration from the ideas of public choice theorists and the more
general currents of neoliberal thought. Yet, not all of the statutes
cohere equally well with the neoliberal image of the state as bloated and
inefficient. I want to suggest that the wide differences in the design of
balanced budget laws across the country reflect a continuing tension
between old and new conceptions of the state. Whereas the Manitoba
and Alberta laws display a particularly strong affinity with neoliberalism,
Saskatchewan's adheres at least partially to the welfare liberal ideal of
government as the active representative of some collectively determined
public interest. This is not to suggest that each statute or provision can
be mapped neatly onto one or the other side of a clear ideological
divide. Rather, balanced budget laws are an excellent illustration of how
old and new orders coexist and are often "subsumed into complex
hybrids which contain part of both."131 It is useful to revisit these three
jurisdictions briefly to demonstrate the point.
There is a remarkably tight fit between certain provisions of the
Alberta and Manitoba laws, and public choice prescriptions for
reforming government. The strict requirement in both provinces for
actual budget balance every year, extended well into the future by debt
repayment schedules, together with Manitoba's special entrenchment
provisions, comprise a determined attempt to narrow substantially the
institutional parameters of fiscal policy making over the long term.
When the tax referenda provisions are factored in, these statutes express
a very strong normative preference for an absolute and permanent
reduction in the state's fiscal capacity. They push governments firmly in
129 Friedman, supra note 125 at 6.
1 3 0 Ibid
131 Arthurs and Kreklewich, supra note 116 at 5.
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the direction of withdrawing services and reducing spending, and not just
on a temporary basis. The Alberta government has already invoked its
balanced budget law to resist pressures to restore social spending, even
though it now has a substantial budget surplus. In his 1996 budget
speech Finance Minister Jim Dinning said, "And let me speak candidly
to those who have their eyes on the surplus. Forget it.... No one can
choose to spend the surplus-it must go to pay down Alberta's debt.
That's the law in Alberta."132 The tax referenda provisions in Manitoba
and Alberta resonate strongly with the notion that deficits have in the
past been caused by special interests that have extracted government
benefits at the expense of a disorganized and silent body of ordinary
taxpayers. The threat of a salary penalty for cabinet members in
Manitoba bears perhaps the strongest imprint of public choice logic. It
adopts wholeheartedly the idea that state actors are motivated primarily
by self-interest, and that their decisions can thus be improved by
introducing the appropriate market incentives into the governance
process.
Public choice ideas and rhetoric have achieved wide influence in
both academic and popular thinking about fiscal policy, and are often
presented as a form of neutral or at least "non-partisan"1 33 analysis. In
fact, public choice theory promotes a highly specific set of normative
choices for society that depart from liberal democratic understandings of
government in which elected representatives are responsible for
effecting policies that serve some larger public interest. In a liberal
framework, at least in principle, the public good is to have no one fixed
definition, but rather is left open to deliberation through interest group
politics, voting, and other mechanisms of democracy.134 Certainly,
uncritical accounts of liberal government run the risk of grossly
overstating its real life representivity and independence from powerful
private interests. But as David Schneiderman has argued, this only
suggests a need to enhance public dialogue around economic policies,
rather than attempting to entrench one value preference, such as market
efficiency, over all others.135 A strict balanced-budget requirement
132 Quoted in R. Kneebone & K. McKenzie, "Alberta's Deficit Elimination Program: Lessons
for Others" (December 1996) Pol'y Options 43 at 44.
133 M. Cote, "Keynote Address: Coping with the Canadian Public Debt Crisis" in Deficits and
Debt: Proceedings of the Colloquium (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 1993) 9 at 9
[hereinafter Deficits and Debt].
134 See D. Schneiderman, "Economic Citizenship and Deliberative Democracy: An Inquiry
into Constitutional Limitations on Economic Regulation" (1995-96) 21 Queen's L. J. 125 at 146-51.
135 Jbid.
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attempts to "enclave economic matters, shielding them from broadly-
based debate and contestation."13 6
In striking contrast to Manitoba and Alberta, Saskatchewan's
relatively flexible and proceduralist law bears strong traces of a more
traditional liberal vision in which government's task is to balance
competing political and economic interests, and respond to shifting
public priorities. By measuring budget balance over a multi-year cycle,
and always subject to major unanticipated changes in revenue or
expenditure, Saskatchewan (and to a lesser extent New Brunswick and
Quebec) has left room for the stimulative and redistributive spending
that is the hallmark of the activist, liberal welfare state. Saskatchewan
requires each new government to lay out a debt management plan, but
does not prescribe the substantive content of such plans or restrict the
use of future surpluses, leaving those choices for the elected
representatives. The implicit assumption is that the policy process is
driven not just by the self-interest of government actors, but also by what
Michael Trebilcock describes as "public spirit, or civic virtue, or simply
non-self-interested ideas."137 The problem with using salary penalties or
other such private incentives to guide bureaucratic conduct, Trebilcock
points out, is that they presume a prior political agreement on exactly
what goals the government should achieve. Unlike the private sector,
where profit maximization can be identified unproblematically as the key
measure of performance, governments are subject to conflicting
mandates and pressures.138 Whereas the public choice argument, in its
extreme form, assumes away that essential political question,
Saskatchewan's approach, at least in principle, preserves space for its
discussion.
In a recent paper comparing the deficit cutting strategies of
Alberta and Saskatchewan, Neil Thomlinson draws a similar link
between fiscal policy choices and prevailing conceptions of the role of
government. He points out that Alberta's Progressive Conservative
leadership has "frequently asserted its belief in smaller government,"
and has "expressed ... confidence that, without excessive interference,
the free market will solve most problems, including social ills such as
136 Ibid at 170. Schneiderman makes this comment in the context of analyzing a proposed
common market amendment to the Constitution.
13 7 Trebilcock, supra note 115 at 32. See also D. Farber "Democracy and Disgust: Reflections
on Public Choice" (1989) 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 161 at 162-66.
138 Trebilcock, supra note 115 at 62-65.
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unemployment." 139 By contrast, the NDP government in Saskatchewan
has moved to eliminate its deficit without abandoning the concept of
citizen entitlements. Premier Roy Romanow has explicitly rejected the
minimal-government philosophy of Alberta in favour of preserving
"communitarian action through our government agencies,"1 40 and
Thomlinson shows how this has translated into a more egalitarian mix of
expenditure cuts and tax increases in Saskatchewan.
Policy differences of this kind can impact profoundly on the
distribution of the costs and benefits of fiscal restraint among more and
less privileged citizens, and hence they are worth examining and
evaluating. At the same time, it would be wrong to suggest that these
provinces occupy two extreme ends of a very wide political spectrum.
The very fact that Saskatchewan, like Alberta and Manitoba, has enacted
a balanced budget law speaks volumes about the common boundaries
around current political debate. The rise of fiscal limitation laws across
the country is a powerful reminder of Ralph Miliband's point that
"[w]hat is really striking about ... political office holders [in advanced
capitalist societies] ... is not their many differences, but the extent of
their agreement on fundamental issues."1 41 By its very existence, and
regardless of the precise model which is adopted, balanced budget
legislation helps to construct deficit and debt reduction as matters of
paramount importance to the public interest, which the regular
institutions of the political system cannot be trusted to resolve. The
careful preservation of policy flexibility in Saskatchewan's law may be
partially illusory when one considers the material and ideological forces
pushing a welfare liberal state towards the fiscal agenda of
neoliberalism. In the next Part, I argue that the rise of balanced budget
legislation in Canada presents dangers of an economic, social and
democratic nature, and that these problems are not restricted to the
more severe versions in some provinces.
139 N.R. Thomlinson, "Same Problems, Different Solutions: Balancing Budgets in Alberta and
Saskatchewan" (Paper presented at the Annual General Meeting of the Canadian Political Science
Association, Conference of Learned Societies, Brock University, St. Catherines, Ontario, June
1996) at 7 [unpublished; on file with author].
140 Ibid. at 8.
141 R. Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Quartet Books, 1973) at 64.
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IV. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRATIC
CRITIQUES OF BALANCED BUDGET LAWS
A. Economic Hazards
There is disagreement among political economists and other
commentators about the real causes of deficits, the nature and
seriousness of their economic effects, and what fiscal or monetary
measures should be taken to reduce them.142 Changes to monetary
policy (interest rates), taxation levels, program spending, and/or
strategies to promote employment and -investment have all been
proposed in various combinations as possible policy responses to the
build up of deficits. Those who favour strong measures to eliminate
deficits often assert that fiscal control is a matter of economic necessity
and indeed will generate economic benefits to compensate for the
immediate hardships of restraint. In tabling its balanced budget law, for
example, the Manitoba government stressed that "[a] balanced budget is
... essential for sustained economic growth."143 This section of the
article offers a critical assessment of such claims. I draw attention to
compelling arguments that a strict requirement for budget balance is in
fact bad economic policy-arguments that have been articulated by
commentators spanning the full range of views on the deficit issue. Far
from being good fiscal management, a balanced budget mandate is
better viewed as a reckless policy that risks damaging the economy at its
most vulnerable moments. The current zeal for abolishing deficits
reflects a grossly oversimplistic view of the state as merely a burden on
the private economy.
A total ban on public sector borrowing is economic nonsense
because it ignores the crucial role that government spending plays in
stabilizing the economy during private sector recessions. As one group
of researchers put it, "[t]he fundamental problem with requiring an
annually balanced budget is that the problem of cyclically volatile
142 For a sampling of different theories and perspectives see Deficits and Debt, supra note 133;
"Politics of Scarcity," supra note 46; P. Dungan & T. Wilson, "Altering the Fiscal-Monetary Policy
Mix: Credible Policies to Reduce the Federal Deficit" (1985) Can. Tax J. 309; Gillespie, supra note
46; L. Osberg & P. Fortin, eds., Unnecessary Debts (Toronto: Lorimer, 1996); and Wolfe, supra note
46.
143 Why Balanced Budget Legislation? (Winnipeg: Manitoba, Department of Finance, 1995),
available on the Internet at http://www.gov.mb.ca/manitoba/finance/text/bda-tx0l.html.
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revenues is not solved."144 In periods of low economic activity and high
unemployment, governments normally incur so-called cyclical deficits, as
tax revenues decline and spending is increased on unemployment
insurance, agricultural and other subsidies, social assistance and other
programs. In these circumstances, deficit spending performs the helpful
function of providing some degree of economic security to persons, as
well as stimulating the private economy by supporting levels of demand
for goods and services. The existence of cyclical deficits "is entirely as it
should be, since it demonstrates the workings of the built-in fiscal
stabilizers inherent in our tax and transfer system." 145
Both federal and provincial governments play a role in effecting
stabilization policy. Traditionally, economists have been skeptical about
the wisdom of instituting counter-cyclical stabilizing measures at the
provincial level.1 46 Certainly the provinces are somewhat less powerful
intervenors in this regard, as they lack control over monetary policy and
are more vulnerable to capital flight and other forms of leakage of policy
impacts across their borders.1 47 However, more recent opinion attaches
growing importance to the economic effects of provincial fiscal policy, in
part due to wider variations in regional economic conditions, and the
trend towards devolution of spending responsibilities to the provinces. 148
Certainly, provincial actions can have a significant impact on local and
national economic conditions, not least because they inevitably have
feedback effects on other governments. The budgetary policy of one
provincial government can affect the fiscal capacity and hence the
economic management strategies of the federal government, for
example, as well as that of the other provinces.1 49 The adoption of
144 B. Braun, L.E. Johnson & R.D. Ley, "State Revenue Shortfalls: Budget Restraints and
Policy Alternatives" (1993) 52 Am. J. Econ. & Soc. 385 at 394.
145 B. Scarfe, "Economic Fluctuations and Stabilization Policy in Canada: The State of the
Art" (1987) 13 Can. Pub. Pol'y 75 at 81. By contrast, the so-called structural deficit is the gap
between expenditures and revenues that would exist even if the economy was operating at full
employment: see Doern, Maslove & Prince, supra note 19 at 20.
146 See W.E. Oates, "The Theory of Public Finance in a Federal System" (1968) Can. J. Econ.
37.
147See Maslove, Prince & Doern, supra note 19 at 170-77.
148 The literature is reviewed in W.M. Scarth, "Provincial Stabilization Policy: Coordination
Issues" in Limits to Govermnent, supra note 2, 44.
149 Dupr6, supra note 123 at 379. An excellent example, at 394, is Ontario's recent decision
to cut income tax rates, which may in turn affect the size and distribution of federal equalization
payments to other provinces. Another is the British Columbia government's imposition of a three
month residency condition on new applicants for social assistance in the province, prompted in part
(it asserted) by an influx of welfare recipients from other provinces that were cutting social
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balanced budget laws by a majority of the sub-national governments in
Canada may also produce cumulative effects that approximate the
impact of a federal policy.
A rigid requirement to balance the budget each and every year
undermines a government's capacity to perform its stabilization
function. Because of the difficulty of anticipating when recessionary
pressures will mount and the imperfection of other policy levers
available to government, the danger is that a fall off in demand levels
would have to be met by immediate spending cuts, "pushing the
economy much deeper into recession and seriously postponing the onset
of recovery."15 0 Besides creating the potential for short term crisis, an
absolute prohibition on borrowing may also prove inefficient over the
longer term. Bradley Braun, L.E. Johnson, and Robert Ley found that
state governments forced to achieve annual balance did so most often by
reducing service levels, usually via crude across the board expenditure
cuts.i15 They point out that the resulting uneven flow of services is
inconsistent with the maximization of economic welfare over time, and
that sudden fiscal policy changes make for a less stable business
climate.15 2 Moreover, this approach may undermine future prosperity as
the condition of infrastructure declines. Though these economists
support the view that government deficits and spending should be
reduced, they argue that annual balance requirements are too rigid, in
that their opportunity costs may outweigh their benefits in any particular
case.
These sorts of concerns prompted several dozen American
economists to issue an open letter opposing -passage of a balanced
budget amendment to the United States Constitution. Though spanning
a range of views on economic policy, all agreed that "requiring balanced
budgets in each fiscal year regardless of prevailing economic
circumstances is bad public policy."153  Significantly, even James
Buchanan, a public choice economist and one of the most vociferous
assistance rates. In response, the federal government withheld an amount of social program
funding from British Columbia (the residency requirement has now been repealed).
150 C.L. Schultze, "The Balanced Budget Amendment: Needed? Effective? Efficient?" (1995)
48 Nat'l Tax J. 317 at 325. See also, for example, R. Greenstein, (1997) 76 Cong. Dig. 91; A.M.
Rivlin, (1995) 74 Cong. Dig. 47; R. Rubin, (1997) 76 Cong. Dig. 75; R.J. Saulnier, "Do We Need a
Balanced-Budget Amendment to the Constitution?" (1988) 18 Presidential Stud. Q. 157 at 158; and
Wildavsky, supra note 51 at 12-13.
151 Braun, Johnson & Ley, supra note 144 at 388.
152 ibid. at 392-95.
153 "Economists Oppose Balanced Budget Amendment to the U.S. Constitution" (May-June
1992) 35 Challenge 59 at 59.
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academic proponents of balanced budget laws, has conceded there is a
risk of aggravating recessionary trends if deficits are prohibited under all
circumstances.lS 4 In response to this concern, Buchanan recommends
that only the budget plan, prepared using fair estimates of revenues and
expenditures, should be subject to annual balancing. The law, in his
view, should not prohibit actual deficits arising from unforeseen changes
in economic conditions after the budget is approved.155  Other
commentators have proposed addressing the destabilization concern by
requiring governments only to balance a so-called high employment
budget.156 Under this system, revenues and expenditures would be
estimated based on low unemployment assumptions, and deficits
attributable to higher unemployment levels would be permissible.
Another possible safeguard, favoured by Braun, Johnson, and Ley, is to
relax anti-deficit rules by requiring balance only over a longer multi-year
period, or to set a period within which government must repay any
recessionary borrowings once the economy begins to recover.15 7 It is
useful to revisit the design of Canadian balanced budget laws in light of
the economic hazards and possible solutions identified by these
American economists.
Significantly, Canadian legislators have directed governments
not just to plan for a balanced budget (Buchanan's proposal, and the
practice of most American states)!58 but to show that actual balance has
been achieved at year end. This feature alone makes the Canadian laws
comparatively rigid and inflexible. Some jurisdictions have done more
than others, however, to address the danger of economic destabilization.
Provinces like Saskatchewan and New Brunswick that measure fiscal
balance over a multi-year period have certainly built in a degree of
flexibility to respond to economic downturns. Notably, however, their
four-year fiscal periods coincide more closely with electoral cycles than
with the variable cycles of the economy. Should recession commence
toward the end of an electoral mandate, either government could find
itself under pressure to restrain spending in order to report a balanced
budget for the period, potentially worsening the private economy when it
most needs bolstering. Saskatchewan might sidestep this problem by
15 4 Supra note 127 at 352-353.
155 Ibid.
156 See Schultze, supra note 150 at 325-326; and C.J. Whalen, "The Case Against a Balanced-
Budget Amendment" (Spring 1995) 25 Soc. Pol'y 45 at 47.
1 5 7 Supra note 144 at 395.
158 NASBO, supra note 77.
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appealing to its "major unanticipated event" clause, or New Brunswick
may remind voters that its law only sets out an "objective," but in either
case the need to get around the balanced budget law would place the
government on the political defensive. Thus, even the two provinces
that have done the most to retain fiscal flexibility may find that their new
laws create political disincentives to engage in stabilization spending.
The problem is more worrisome still in the other provinces and
in the Northwest Territories. The extreme cases, of course, are Alberta
and Manitoba. Alberta's sole concession to economic variability is its
use of conservative forecasting assumptions to estimate resource
dependent revenues. It requires actual budget balance every year, and
has no relieving provisions to permit deficit spending in recessions.
Manitoba also requires strict annual balance, relaxing this rule only
when revenues drop by at least 5 per cent. There is no accomodation for
less dramatic revenue fluctuations, or for sudden increases in
expenditure, nor does the exception for "natural or other disasters" lend
itself easily to addressing problems of economic stability. During the
severe recession of the early 1990s, for example, Ontario government
revenues dropped by 4.5 per cent in a single year, while social assistance
expenditures across all provinces increased by 16.5 per cent.l5 9 Changes
of this magnitude would not be sufficient to trigger the contingency
clause in Manitoba's balanced budget law.
Added to the political disincentives for backing down on fiscal
targets in a recession are the personal financial disincentives facing
Manitoba cabinet ministers, who stand to suffer salary penalties if they
engage in deficit spending. Moreover, the tax referendum laws in both
Alberta and Manitoba will very likely bias any necessary fiscal
adjustments heavily in favour of spending cuts. It is disturbing to note
that even public choice economist Buchanan advises against combining a
zero deficit rule with a tax limitation clause. Though governments
should be forced to present a realistic balanced budget plan each year,
Buchanan argues, he accepts that how the deficit is to be eliminated is a
political question that should be left to elected governments. 160
It is cause for concern that Manitoba and Alberta have gone well
beyond the outer limits of balanced budget restrictions proposed by even
the most conservative American economists. Manitoba may answer that
it has created a Fiscal Stabilization Fund precisely to address the need
for higher recessionary spending. Alberta has been urged to create a
159 Maslove & Moore, supra note 29 at 340-341.
160 Supra note 127 at 351.
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similar contingency fund for this purpose.16 1 However, this strategy too
has limitations. The stabilization fund first must be accumulated out of
budget surpluses over a period of years, and must be large enough to
cushion the government against a recession that lasts more than one
year. A recent report by a major credit rating agency stressed that
Manitoba will have to build up a larger stabilization fund if it is to avoid
running deficits in the next economic downturn.162  American
commentators have also identified a serious political weakness of reserve
funds. If allowed to grow as large as necessary to perform their function,
they can attract public resentment about tax levels remaining static while
services decline. Negative public reaction to the build up of large
surplus funds has been cited as one of the factors that triggered the
California property tax revolt of the late 1970s.163 Thus Braun, Johnson,
and Ley have concluded that "contingency funds may supplement, but
do not replace traditional budget balancing strategies."164
The foregoing discussion suggests that the new balanced budget
laws are to varying degrees ill-conceived and poorly designed, even when
evaluated in terms of their economic effect, which is often assumed to be
their most advantageous feature. In the next section of the article, I
argue that such legislation is also deeply problematic when viewed from
the perspective of social justice.
B. Social (In)Justice and the Drive for Balanced Budgets
The previous section presented evidence that balanced budget
laws are unlikely to deliver the economic benefits often claimed for
them, and in fact may well promote inefficient and destabilizing patterns
of public spending. I now shift the focus to analyze their social justice
implications. I begin by considering the negative impact of existing
neoliberal restructuring policies on less privileged members of society,
particularly the ways in which social spending cuts have reinforced
inequalities rooted in class, gender, race and other relations of power.
161 B. Laghi, "Set Up New Rainy-Day Fund in Alberta, Experts Urge" The [Toronto] Globe
and Mail (14 September 1996) A4.
162 Moody's Investors Service, Canadian Credit Report: Province of Manitoba (New York: 17
June 1996) at 1.
163 See, for example; W.H. Oakland, "Proposition 13: Genesis and Consequences" in G.G.
Kaufman & K.T. Rosen, eds., The Property Tax Revolt: The Case of Proposition 13 (Cambridge:
Ballinger, 1981) 31 at 40-43.
164 Supra note 144 at 392.
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The deficit scare has played a crucial role in legitimating the abdication
of governmental responsibility for social injustice. I argue that the
current movement to legislate anti-deficit and anti-tax measures
threatens to entrench this regressive approach to social policy more
deeply and irretrievably. I discuss the possible instrumental effects of
the new laws on short term budgetary decisions, as well as their wider
significance in shaping public discourse, and conclude that balanced
budget laws will only increase the difficulty of articulating and
implementing a social justice agenda.
Efforts to roll back the welfare state are best seen as one aspect
of a larger political and economic movement to liberalize private
markets and reduce the costs of capitalist production. Thus,
restructuring has entailed significant cost-cutting and employment
reductions in the private sector as well as in government. On the public
side, which is the focus of this paper, aggressive efforts to reduce
budgetary deficits have too often been pursued at the expense of
programs designed to enhance social justice. In crafting their deficit and
debt reduction policies in the 1990s, governments have relied far more
heavily on expenditure cuts than" on tax increases.1 65 Indeed, many
politicians have boasted of their commitment to eliminate deficits by
cutting spending, and have rejected the option of raising more tax
revenue from individuals and corporations with substantial ability to
pay.166 In its 1997 budget, for instance, the federal government observed
proudly that "[e]xpenditure reductions have been the overwhelming
165 Total spending for all levels of government has been reduced from a high of 51.6 per cent
of Gross Domestic Product (CDP) in 1992, to 47.6 per cent in 1995. Total tax revenues have also
declined over the same period, from a peak of 36.7 per cent of CDP down to 35.9 per cent in 1995:
D.B. Perry, "Fiscal Figures: Changes in Government Spending Patterns" (1996) 44 Can. Tax J. 578
at 581 and 585. Perry concludes, at 579, that "[g]iven the small change in the relative importance of
revenues, the improvement in the deficit picture is testimony to the effectiveness of expenditure
restraint at all levels of government." Not all provinces have weighted their anti-deficit strategies as
heavily in favour of spending cuts; some have used a more balanced mix of cuts and revenue
increases: Maslove & Moore, supra note 29 at 347.
166 For a budget proposal that would use progressive taxation more heavily to help eliminate
the deficit while restoring social program expenditures to earlier levels, see Alternative Federal
Budget Papers 1997. A Million Jobs, Economic Security, A Budget for the Future (Ottawa: Canadian
Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1997) at 3-40. See also H. Mackenzie, "Renewing the Fiscal
Capacity of the State" in D. Drache & A. Ranachan, eds., Warm Heart, Cold Country: Fiscal and
Social Policy Reform in Canada, (Ottawa: Caledon Institute of Social Policy/Robarts Centre for
Canadian Studies, York University, 1995) 151; and D. Ross, "Curbing Debt: Finding a Balance
Between Taxes and Expenditures": ibid., 293.
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source of deficit reduction." 167 These expenditure cuts have fallen very
heavily on social programs, meaning health, education, income security
programs and social services. For example, social spending in Alberta
dropped to the lowest level in the country in the 1990s while the
government continued to subsidize private business more generously
than any other province.1 68 Within the social envelope, welfare and
other social services that tend to benefit the most impoverished and
disadvantaged groups have been targetted especially harshly by some
provinces. In Ontario, for example, the Progressive Conservative
government reduced social assistance rates by over 21 per cent in its first
year of office, imposing about one-quarter of its planned spending
reductions for the year exclusively on welfare recipients.1 69
It is important to note that the decline of provincial social
services has been directly facilitated by the federal government's
abolition of the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP), the former vehicle for
federal-provincial cost sharing of social programming, and the creation
of a new block fund, the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST). 170
Besides dramatically reducing total federal funding for health, education
and welfare, the CHST has removed most of the national standards
governing provincial welfare delivery, including the requirements that
provinces provide welfare to all citizens in need, and take into account
the basic requirements of living in setting welfare rates.1 71 The CHST also
gives the provinces full discretion over funding levels for other social
services, such as legal aid for family and other non-criminal matters, day
care, assistance for homeless people, sexual assault counselling, women's
167 Budget 97, supra note 1 at 9. Indeed, the budget claims, at 11, that 91 per cent of the
reduction in the deficit is due to expenditure cuts. While this figure fails to give adequate credit to
other factors such as interest savings and higher economic growth, it does indicate the government's
emphasis on spending cuts relative to tax increases.
168 See K. Taft, Shredding the Public Interest. Ralph Klein and 25 Years of One-Party
Government (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1997) especially c. 5 and 7. Federal social
spending reportedly fell from 12.3 per cent of GDP in 1983-84 to 10.7 per cent in 1990-91: I. Bakker
& K. Scott, "From the Postwar to the Post-Liberal Keynesian Welfare State" in W. Clement, ed.,
Understanding Canada: Building on the New Canadian Political Economy (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1997) 286 at 302.
169 See Masse v. Ontario (Community and Social Services) (1996), 134 D.L.R. (4th) 20 at 24,
44, and 58 (Div CL) (an unsuccessful challenge to welfare reduction under the Charter).
170 See A.M. Maslove, "The Canada Health and Social Transfer: Forcing Issues" in G.
Swimmer, ed., How Ottawa Spends 1996-97. Life Under the Knife (Ottawa: Carleton University Press,
1996) 283 [hereinafter "Forcing Issues"]; and K. Battle & S. Torjman, "How Finance Reformed
Social Policy" in Drache & Ranachan, eds., supra note 166,407.
171 See M. Jackman, "Women and the Canada Health and Social Transfer: Ensuring Gender
Equality in Federal Welfare Reform" (1996) 8 C.J.W.L. 372.
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shelters, or services for disabled people. Whereas federal transfers
under the CAP, were withdrawn if a province ceased to fund a particular
social program, the CHST gives provinces virtually complete freedom to
cut or cancel social services, with no financial penalty. As the total pool
of federal resources shrinks, even well-intentioned provincial
governments will be tempted to starve social services in order to shore
up the health and education systems, the latter being more broad-based
and popular with middle class voters.
Social programs have borne an enormous share of the costs of
fiscal restraint, especially in light of the fact that they contributed very
little if anything to the build up of the public debt since the late 1970s.
The notion that excessive social spending was somehow responsible for
the deterioration of Canada's fiscal condition has now been thoroughly
discredited. Looking back on the last two decades, numerous analysts
have concluded that an extraordinarily high interest rate policy,
combined with the lower employment and economic growth that high
interest rates helped to engender, are overwhelmingly responsible for
the dramatic rise in the debt burden.1 72 Nor are social spending cuts
primarily responsible for the recent success of some governments in
shrinking or even eliminating their deficits. Rather, the explanation lies
in the increased revenues they are enjoying in a period of stronger
economic growth, helped along by lower interest rates.173  It is
interesting to note that the same economic factors were responsible for
diminishing the massive levels of public debt accumulated during the war
years.174 These facts cast grave doubt on whether the degree of social
spending cuts made in recent years was ever warranted or needed to
balance government budgets.
Necessary or not, social program cuts have been made, and are
taking an especially heavy toll on less privileged members of society:
groups that have limited access to labour market income, rely more
heavily on social services, and are over-represented among the income
172 See "Politics of Scarcity" supra note 46; Dungan & Wilson, supra note 142; and Gillespie,
supra note 46. See also P. Fortin, "The Canadian Fiscal Problem: The Macroeconomic
Connection" in Osberg & Fortin, eds., supra note 142; R.D. Kneebone, "Deficits and Debt in
Canada: Some Lessons from Recent History" (1994) 22 Can. Pub. Pol. 152; J. Stanford, "Growth,
Interest and Debt: Canada's Fall from the Fiscal Knife-Edge" in Alternative Federal Budget Papers
1997,supra note 166,275; and Mackenzie, supra note 166. Several of these analysts also identify the
failure to maintain an adequate tax base as a contributing factor. On the fiscal consequences of
eroding the tax base through special exemptions and other concessions, see Wolfe, supra note 46.
173 See G. Gibson, "The Snake Oil in the Federal Budget" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (4
March 1997) A17. In Alberta, booming natural resource revenues helped to produce the surplus.
174 See Dupr6, supra note 123 at 380.
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and wealth poor of the nation. Women, racialized people, the elderly
poor, and people with disabilities, will thus tend to suffer
disproportionately (though not exclusively) from the hardships of fiscal
restraint. There is a growing literature concerning the gendered impact
of restructuring policies.175 Besides being heavy users of social
programs, women are employed in large numbers in the public sector
and hence will bear much of the brunt of job losses and declining
working conditions in government departments and institutions. But
perhaps most important is the increased burden being shifted onto
women as caregivers, consequent upon the withdrawal of state funded
social services. The contraction of public health care, education, child
care and other services is only possible because families, meaning
primarily women, expand their caregiving labour to compensate.
Neoliberal policies rely implicitly on women to act as "shock
absorbers,"176 cushioning the impact of cutbacks by increasing their
household labour to ensure that basic human needs are met. 77 Because
women's domestic labour remains invisible and un(der)compensated,
many of the costs of restructuring can be buried by simply adding them
to women's workday.
The impact of restructuring on particular women is clearly
dependant on their social location in terms of class, race, sexual identity,
age and other factors. Those women (and men) who are relatively well
situated in the labour market, for example, will increasingly replace
public day care and other services by hiring private domestic workers,
often immigrant women of colour, who typically receive low wages and
benefits and lack many of the legal and social protections enjoyed by
those in the more formal workforcej 78 Low-income women, with or
without access to a male wage, will be particularly squeezed by the
contraction of social programs. Neoliberalism suffers from a profound
contradiction in that it simultaneously requires women to intensify their
social reproductive labour and to earn more market income. Declining
labour market conditions for men and women alike, combined with the
reduction of cash transfers and supports from government, mean that
175 See I. Bakker, ed., The Strategic Silence: Gender and Change in Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1996) [hereinafter Strategic Silence]; and Politics on the Margins, supra
note 114.
176 Politics on the Maigins, supra note 114 at 19.
177 See also P. Armstrong, "Unravelling the Safety Net: Transformations in Health Care and
Their Impact on Women" in Women and Policy, supra note 114, 129 especially at 136-140.
178 See A.B. Bakan & D.K. Strasiulus, "Structural Adjustment, Citizenship, and Foreign
Domestic Labour: The Canadian Case" in Rethinking Restructuring, supra note 117,217.
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women have fewer choices about engaging in paid labour.179 Perhaps
best exemplifying this tightening bind is the situation of single mothers,
who are subject all at once to decreased child care subsidies and welfare
transfers, more onerous conditions and surveillance around social
assistance, and exhortations to become more independent by seeking
paid work in a high-unemployment labour market.18 0
Even accepting, for the purposes of argument, that balancing the
budget is a matter of utmost urgency, it is plain that the means chosen by
Canadian governments to advance that goal entail a variety of
deleterious consequences for social justice and equality. The changes
wrought by restructuring are far more heterogenous than this brief
survey can capture, and their precise implications will vary among
provinces, municipalities, institutions and individuals. The broad
pattern, however, is disturbingly clear: governments are offloading
responsibility for basic human welfare onto insecure labour markets and
overstressed families.
What, if anything, do balanced budget laws add to this scenario
of rising social disparity? They are sometimes viewed as mere
reflections of a larger political unwillingness to grapple with social
justice concerns, not very different from the unlegislated deficit
reduction schedules announced periodically by finance ministers. I
argue here, however, that the enactment of fiscal limitation laws is an
important new departure from de facto fiscal restraint, and one that
needs to be resisted on its own terms from a social justice perspective.
Certainly, it would be wrong to suggest that balanced budget legislation
is the primary causal force behind social spending cuts, such that its
repeal would necessarily result in a more egalitarian fiscal policy. It is
worth remembering, for instance, that the withdrawal of federal social
spending in recent years has gone well beyond the requirements of the
old Spending ControlAct,181 and is now being implemented without the
help of any balanced budget law at the federal level. However, the
entrenchment of neoliberal fiscal agendas in legislative form potentially
raises new barriers to equality-seeking initiatives. My concerns are at
two levels: the instrumental effects that balanced budget laws may have
179 See P. Armstrong, "The Feminization of the Labour Force" in Rethinking Restructuring,
supra note 117, 29; and J. Fudge, "Fragmentation and Feminization: The Challenge of Equity for
Labour-Relations Policy" in Women andPolicy, supra note 114,57.
180 See P. Evans, "Single Mothers and Ontario's Welfare Policy: Restructuring the Debate" in
Women and Policy, supra note 114,151.
18 1 Supra note 7.
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on specific budgetary decisions; and their discursive significance in the
production of public agendas hostile to social spending.
First, provincial balanced budget legislation can be expected to
generate increased pressure for regressive spending cuts whenever
revenues decline, as they will when the economy again goes into
recession. These laws have been enacted at a time of relative economic
strength, and designed to last indefinitely into the future. The next
economic downturn may trigger a new round of harsh cuts if
governments are to comply with their laws, particularly since the federal
government has capped its transfers under the CHST and will no longer
automatically share half the cost of a higher social assistance bill. If
nothing else, the presence of balanced budget legislation increases the
political costs of spending money to alleviate poverty and other dire
effects of recession on people. These concerns were voiced by
opposition members of the legislative assembly in Manitoba in the
following terms:
What is going to happen in years down the road when the pressure is really on this
government, when the [reductions in] federal transfer payments do start to kick in and
bite .... What is going to happen with health care when the choice of this government
and particularly this cabinet is between funding health care or getting their own salaries
reduced by 20 or40 per cent?182
I think we could see the ministers actually punishing the poor and cutting programs in
order to keep their budget in line just so they would not lose their salaries ... . To save
face and to save salary, they would reduce whatever they had to within that budget.
1 83
While it is possible to increase taxes to finance rising welfare and social
service costs, political hostility to taxation in the neoliberal era will make
this the less favoured option. Indeed, governments are under concerted
pressure from some lobby groups to cut taxes, which would further
undermine the state's fiscal capacity in the future. Of course, instead of
cutting expenditures or raising taxes a government could choose simply
to run a deficit in violation of its balanced budget law. Governments
have long been accountable for borrowing decisions through the political
system, and through the operation of financial markets. Under a
balanced budget law, however, this borrowing could now be challenged
in the courts.
182 Manitoba, Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings, 1st Sess., 36th Leg., vol. XLV,
No. 42 (4 October 1995) at 3649, S. Struthers.
183 Ibid. at 3652, R. Wowchuk.
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In those provinces with tax limitation laws (currently Alberta,
Manitoba, and British Columbia), the barriers to generating new tax
revenue have been raised even higher relative to the political costs of
cutting expenditures. When the choice lies between holding a
referendum on higher taxes or simply reducing budgetary spending at
the cabinet table, for example, it seems likely that governments will do
almost anything to avoid the former. It is possible, of course, to raise
new revenues without changing tax rates, and another probable effect of
tax limitation laws will be to increase the use of less visible and more
regressive revenue instruments. The example of Massachusetts is
instructive. Following the adoption of a property tax limitation law,
researchers found that local governments began raising more revenue
outside the tax system per se, through measures such as licence and
permit fees, utility charges, higher fees for school lunches and athletics,
and service charges for parks, recreational facilities, trash collection,
ambulance and other health services.184 Moreover, these levies were
often introduced hastily without any careful review of their distributive
consequences.1S5 Charges such as these tend to have a regressive
incidence, especially if they impose the same flat dollar fee on every
user, without regard to ability to pay or any relief for low-income
persons. To the extent they target basic human services, such fees raise
very serious social justice concerns, potentially deterring low-income
people from using the health care system, for example.18 6 Recent,
studies show that some Canadian governments have begun to tap user
fees more heavily as a revenue source.1 87 Freezing taxes legislatively, or
requiring referendum approval for higher tax rates, is likely only to
increase the attraction of non-tax forms of revenue. The result may be
184 L. Susskind & C. Horan, "Understanding How and Why the Most Drastic Cuts Were
Avoided" in L. Susskind & J.F. Serio, eds., Proposition 2112: Its Impact on Massachusetts
(Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1983) 263 at 275-278; and P.L. McCarney, "Increasing
Reliance on User Fees and Charges": ibid., 351.
185 McCarney, supra note 184 at 355.
186 See R.M. Bird & T. Tsiopoulos, "User Charges for Public Services: Potentials and
Problems" (1997) 45 Can. Tax J. 25 at 75. The authors argue that user charges can be an effective
means of achieving efficiencies in the delivery of public services, and that distributional problems
can be addressed through careful design of the user charges themselves, or through the provision of
cash transfers. However, they concede that many of the user charges in place today are not well
designed to meet these objectives.
187 Maslove & Moore, supra note 29 at 344. Figures gathered by Bird & Tsiopoulos, supra
note 186 at 66, indicate only a slight increase in total user charges across all governments since 1984-
85, with the largest increase at the provincial level.
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simply to shift more of the burden of financing government services onto
those who have the least ability to pay.188
Fiscal limitation laws also threaten to exacerbate inequality of
access to the budget process. Cuts may be needed swiftly in mid-budget
cycle as actual expenditure and revenue levels become known,
diminishing the scope for public input as to how priorities should be
adjusted to ensure budget targets are met. Again, the evidence from
Massachusetts shows that when local governments engaged in crisis
cutting to meet their fiscal targets, the decision-making process became
more closed and autocratic. The voice of poor constituencies was
diminished even further, creating concern that "efficiency measures will
be imposed on unpopular groups and weak programs rather than on
truly wasteful programs."189 Though their precise impact is yet to be
seen in Canada, fiscal limits are likely to alter budgetary practices in
ways that "will make it more difficult, in the long run, to support a vital
and effective public sector,"190 which in turn will limit our governments'
capacity to ensure a universal and decent level of access to basic goods
and services.
Balanced budget laws will operate not just as coercive
instruments pushing governments toward certain fiscal policies and away
from others, but will also function discursively to help produce
ideologically specific understandings of social justice and its attainability.
That is, aside from any instrumental effects they may have, these laws
will tend to strengthen the already powerful role of restructuring
discourse in shaping the prevailing social vision. The term "restructuring
discourse" has been coined by Janine Brodie and others to describe the
overarching narrative within which the massive structural changes of the
neoliberal era are rendered possible, and their unequal effects
constructed as normal.191 To understand restructuring as a discursive
phenomenon is to reject the notion that these changes are simply
brought to us by external economic forces, and to recognize that their
momentum is supported in large part by "a set of impositional claims" 192
about the ideal form of social order. Restructuring discourse asserts a
new common sense about the proper boundaries between the public
188 Thomlinson, supra note 139 at 8.
18 9 Susskind & Horan, supra note 184 at 279.
190 N. Brooks, "The Changing Structure of the Canadian Tax System: Accomodating the
Rich" (1993) 31 Osgoode Hall U. 137 at 154-155.
191 See Politics on the Margins, supra note 114.
192 Ibid. at 27.
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realms of the state and politics, and the private realms of market and
family, as well as redefining the subjects who participate in these
spheres. This revised "political imaginary,"193 to borrow Fraser's term,
is "often distilled in catchphrases and stereotypical images which
dominate public discourse."19 4 The frequent and positive repetition of
terms such as "balanced budget" and "fiscal responsibility" qualifies
them as important catchphrases in the new Canadian political imaginary.
Indeed, Thom Workman characterizes the deficit scare as the central
lynchpin responsible for effecting a profound loss of public confidence in
the viability of a welfare state. 9 S He argues that "the widespread
support for neoliberal policies, even among elements of the dispossessed
classes, is owing to the ease with which the discourse of fiscal crisis has
affixed itself to Canadian political life."196
Isabella Bakker has noted that restructuring discourse tends to
emphasize certain macro-indicators of governmental performance, such
as how much it has reduced the deficit or the number of public sector
employees, and presents these achievements as advancing a common
good.197  Yet this image of economic progress rests on certain
assumptions about the actors who comprise the economy. The
individual citizen who underwrites this discursive economy is thought to
be relatively autonomous and able to participate in markets, mobile
between economic sectors and regions, and free to access a limitless
supply of social reproductive services in the family when they are
withdrawn by the state. These premises suffer from a "conceptual
silence"198 concerning the ways in which market relations are not neutral
but are structured by social factors such as the gendered division of
reproductive labour. The assumption within restructuring discourse that
all citizens have access to market income ignores the conditions of class,
race, gender and other forms of inequality "that determine when, how,
and which people can exercise 'individual' responsibility .... 199
The valorization of personal responsibility and independence
from government is a central feature of the political imaginary of
193 "Clintonism," supra note 113 at 9.
194 Ibid.
195 Banking on Deception: The Discourse of Fiscal Crisis (Halifax: Femwood, 1996).
19 6Ibid. at 13.
197 "Engendering Macro-Economic Policy Reform in the Era of Global Restructuring and
Adjustment" in Strategic Silence, supra note 175, 1.
198 1bid. at 1.
199 Kline, supra note 120 at 559.
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restructuring.200  The construction of social needs as individual,
apolitical, and private facilitates the state's denial of responsibility for
inequality, as Well as occluding the gender and race based exploitation
through which these so-called private needs are met. Expanding the
boundaries of family responsibility for social reproduction naturalizes
the movement of large amounts of caregiving labour from paid public
sector workers to (mostly) women family members and domestic
workers. The conceptual distinction between productive and
reproductive labour is essentially an arbitrary one that relates more to
where the work is done and whether it is paid, rather than any difference
in economic value.201 As Fraser has put it, the real free riders in this
system are not those who lack employment and need government
support, but all those who free ride on unpaid or underpaid domestic
labour to maximize their own market opportunities.202  The
individualization of social disadvantage leads to a definition of problems
and solutions that stress private, familial responsibility, obscuring
systemic causes and letting the state off the hook.
Those concerned with the social impacts of neoliberal
restructuring need to continue challenging its discursive forms, at the
same time as they protest concrete policy changes or program cuts.
Balanced budget laws should be resisted because they help to reproduce
the dominant ideological discourse of restructuring, whether or not they
can be causally linked to a single specific program cut. Indeed they
represent a more potent form of discourse than non-legal promises or
projections of deficit reduction. Legalizing the image of the balanced
budget as the ultimate test of governmental competence imbues it with
additional discursive power, simply because of the status of law as a
voice of rationality and truth in our culture. In Carol Smart's words,
"law exercises power not simply in its material effects ... but also in its
ability to disqualify other knowledges and experiences." 203 Treasury
officials in New Zealand clearly appreciated this discursive power when
they campaigned for a fiscal limitation law in the early 1990s. Though
the New Zealand Fiscal Responsibility Act enacted in 1994 largely
2 00 See N. Fraser & L. Gordon, "A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S.
Welfare State" (1994) 19.2 Signs 309.
201 See M. Eichler, Family Shifts: Families, Policies, and Gender Equality (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1997) at 17-19.
202 See N. Fraser, "Gender Equity and the Welfare State: A Postindustrial Thought
Experiment" in S. Benhabib, ed., Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the
Political (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996) 218 at 235.
203 See C. Smart, Feminism and the Power of the Law (London: Routledge, 1989) at 11.
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codified existing policies and accounting practices, government officials
took the view that "[flixing them in legislation would raise their symbolic
importance ... [and] increase the constituency for fiscal discipline."204
Such laws may be repealable, but that is not the point. The
strengthening of the ideological hold of restructuring discourse through
law makes it less likely that future governments will summon the
political will to repeal it.
The specific requirements of balanced budget laws, to greater or
lesser degrees in different jurisdictions, tend to shore up the assumptions
and images of restructuring discourse, particularly those of the impotent
and circumscribed state. Certainly, they reinforce the extreme priority
attached to deficit and debt reduction, but more profoundly, they speak
of government in terms of constraint and lack of choice. The state is
now to be deprived of agency by law, as well as by allegedly
uncontrollable global economic forces. It is not only politically but also
juridically "hollow[ed] out."205 As well, the debate over fiscal policy is
refrained in terms of whether the government has obeyed the law, and
away from the political question of whether it has made good choices in
difficult times. They thus threaten to close off whatever space remains
to debate what fiscal and social goals government should be striving for,
allowing politicians to sidestep responsibility for choices that harm the
least privileged members of society. This final point raises issues of
democracy that are the focus of the next section.
C. The False Democracy of Fiscal Limits
One of the claims advanced in favour of balanced budget laws, in
addition to their alleged economic benefits, is that they will enhance the
financial transparency and accountability of government. Provisions
requiring regular public disclosure of fiscal data, prescribing
conservative economic forecasting assumptions, and prohibiting last
minute accounting changes, all speak to this theme of accountability. 206
It is reflected even more strikingly in the tax referenda laws of Manitoba
and Alberta, and in Manitoba's requirement for special public hearings
on any bill to amend or repeal its balanced budget law. The threat of
financial penalties for cabinet ministers in Manitoba, and the possibility
204 J. Kelsey, Economic Fundamentalism (London: Pluto Press, 1995) at 233.
205 Politics on the Margins, supra note 114 at 54.
206 The accountability-related provisions discussed in this paragraph were detailed in Part
II(B)(6), above.
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of dismissal in the Northwest Territories, also play to this desire to hold
government officials more accountable for their fiscal decisions. All of
these provisions hold out the promise of greater honesty and democratic
responsibility in the formation of budgets. I argue in this section,
however, that the democratic promise of balanced budget laws is a false
one. While addressing some legitimate, albeit narrow concerns about
specific accounting practices, these statutes lay no groundwork for any
serious democratization of fiscal policy. Quite to the contrary, their
overwhelming thrust is to discourage public debate about how much
emphasis should be placed on deficit reduction over other goals, who
bears the cost of fiscal restraint, or what means the government should
use to achieve balanced budgets. Fiscal limitation laws ultimately
misrepresent the problems of democracy in a neoliberal era by
constructing governments as the primary source of irresponsible power
in society, distracting attention from the need to render markets and
private accumulations of economic power more amenable to regulation
in the interests of citizens.
There is no question that the fiscal policy process is in need of
democratization. The closed nature of the budget process, and its virtual
capture by a small community of tax experts, has already been noted.
Nor are these problems limited to the fiscal sphere. Commentators from
across the political spectrum have observed that public dissatisfaction
with the limited avenues for participating in Westminster-style
parliamentary institutions have helped to fuel anti-government
sentiments. The recent surge of right-wing populism in Canada can be
attributed in part to its effective expression of this discontent 2 07 But
social critics on the left have also castigated the lack of meaningful
opportunities to deliberate political choices 2 08 Theorizing these issues
from an American perspective, Iris Marion Young has argued that
political participation in welfare states has largely been watered down to
a competition among interest groups for shares of a limited pool of
welfare benefits. Interest group pluralism is but a pale image of
democracy, she asserts, because it limits debate to the distributive
question of who should receive the publically controlled surplus
207 For example, the 1997 election platform of the federal Reform Party promised abundant
use of referenda, popular assemblies, citizen initiatives, recall laws, and free legislative votes: Fresh
Start, supra note 2 at 23. See also P. Boyer, Direct Democracy in Canada (Toronto and Oxford:
Dundurn Press, 1992).
208 See, for example, G. Albo, "Democratic Citizenship and the Future of Public
Management" in G. Albo, D. Langille & L. Panitch, eds.,A DifferentKind of State? Popular Power
and Democratic Administration (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993) 17; and L. Panitch, "A
Different Kind of State?": ibid., 2.
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generated by capitalism. Politics is thus constructed as a competitive
process in which resources are predefined, increasingly scarce, and
accorded to the most effective lobbyists. This is both alienating to many
citizens, because it seems to collapse claims of justice or right into claims
of self-interest, and depoliticizing, because it seldom challenges the
underlying institutional arrangements and cultural images that are
responsible for distributive inequalities in the first place 209 As well, the
dominance of elite expertism over bureaucratic administration
discourages citizen participation, because "most people are convinced
that [the] issues ... are too complex to be understood except by fiscal,
legal and managerial experts."21 0 All of these factors have contributed
to a legitimate backlash against the lack of scope for self-determination.
Given this litany of valid complaints, one hesitates to criticize any
attempt to ensure greater openness in government. However, many of
the accountability claims made for balanced budget laws are exaggerated
or illusory. Not only are they likely to fall short of their self-proclaimed
democratic objectives, but in fact they serve to narrow, rather than
widen, public debate about fiscal policy. Far from enriching
understanding or discussion of major economic policy issues facing the
nation, balanced budget legislation is better viewed as an exercise in
manufacturing consent to a prevailing fiscal agenda that generates
distinctly unequal costs and benefits.
Fiscal limits focus attention exclusively on the budgetary bottom
line, and on the question of how quickly it should reach specified
numerical targets. As such, they shift to the sidelines the substantive
political question of whether fiscal balance is the right goal under all
conditions, and what other objectives might reasonably displace it.
While they do call for disclosure of more information, it is all
information that speaks, once again, to the bottom line. Disclosure
requirements make certain types of facts important and de-emphasize
others, such as the government's record in reducing rates of
unemployment or poverty, or redressing inequalities of income and
wealth. In this way, fiscal limitation laws communicate a great deal
about what is a priority of government. Once in place, they neatly
excuse governments from justifying why deficit and debt reduction
should continue to be their overriding objective. Citizen protests over
program cuts can be deflected with the simple assertion that "the law
209 I.M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1990) at 80.
210 Ibid. See also L. Philipps, "Discursive Deficits: A Feminist Perspective on the Power of
Technical Knowledge in Fiscal Law and Policy" (1996) 11 Can. J. Law & Soc. 141.
[VOL. 34 No. 4
Balanced Budget Laws
made us do it." The adoption of balanced budget laws is a fine example
of how governments in the neoliberal age often assert power precisely by
disclaiming it. As Wendy Brown observes:
the late modern state ... represents itself as pervasively hamstrung, quasi-impotent,
unable to come through on many of its commitments, because it is decentralizing ....
because 'it is no longer the solution to social problems,' because it is 'but one player on a
global chessboard....' 211
Balanced budget laws provide another means for policy makers to deny
responsibility for the fiscal hardships that flow from their affirmative
political choices.
Further, balanced budget laws are anti-democratic because they
encourage social policy decisions to be effected through the budget, a
forum that minimizes opportunities for consultation, compromise, or
protest. It is exceedingly easy to pass a zero deficit requirement in the
abstract, without specifying how the target is to be achieved.212 The real
choices about what spending will be cut (or what new revenues will be
raised) must then be fought out in the annual budget process. This is
problematic in light of the relative insulation of finance ministers and
their staffs from interest groups other than the business sector, and
because of the difficulty of winning changes to the budget once it has
been tabled. As deficit reduction has become the central preoccupation
of governments, finance officials have acquired growing influence over
social policy reform. 213 Justice and social services ministers increasingly
profess to have no power over major policy decisions related to their
own portfolios. The abolition of the cAP and the wholesale restructuring
of federal social transfers under the CHST, for example, was developed by
the Department of Finance with little input from Human Resources
Development or other social ministries.2 14 First announced publicly by
Paul Martin in his 1995 budget speech, the CHST not surprisingly
"displayed more evidence of federal expenditure control than of social
program considerations."21s The need to comply with balanced budget
laws and to report frequently on fiscal progress is likely to reinforce the
dominance of finance officials over spending decisions.
211 States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1995) at 194.
212 Schultze, supra note 150 at 320-321.
213 Battle & Toriman, supra note 170 at 418-420.
214 "Forcing Issues," supra note 170 at 284.
215 Ibl.
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The types of accountability mechanisms favoured by fiscal
limitation laws rest upon a particular conception of the political subject
as articulated within restructuring discourse. The citizen who inhabits
this discourse is constructed as an individual unallied with any so-called
special interest, and as a self-reliant actor who believes in markets,
personal responsibility, and the value of a circumscribed state. For this
mythical individual, "measurable performance indicators become the
ultimate test of democratic accountability, whilst citizenship is effectively
reconstructed as a consumer status."216 Efficiency, then, becomes an
end in itself and the only legitimate criterion for evaluating public
services.
It is vital to consider who is left out of this new concept of
citizenship. There are a host of ways in which the marketization of the
state works not to enhance political participation, but to reinscribe and
worsen the exclusions already familiar under welfare state liberalism.
Many of the institutions of state and civil society that historically have
facilitated the expression of minority or dissenting views are now being
dismantled, defunded or privatized. Harry Arthurs points out, for
example, that neoliberal governments have a propensity to work out the
fine details of government downsizing-which programs and services will
be lost-through executive orders and managerial directives, rather than
more open processes such as legislation.217 As well, bureaucratic
efficiency measures are reducing opportunities for direct contact
between administrators and welfare state clients in favour of more
routinized and impersonal modes of service delivery, while at the same
time less legal aid and other advocacy funding is available to assist
individuals in claiming their entitlements.218 And private service
providers operating under contract to governments are often less
responsive to users, particularly to low income clients who have little
economic power to assert against for-profit enterprises.219
Democracy is not merely a function of how the central organs of
the state operate, but also requires the organized participation of
citizens. In this regard, balanced budget laws promise only to exacerbate
the impoverishment of community political organizations under
restructuring. Isolated individuals generally can play only a limited role
216 N. Lacey, "Government as Manager, Citizen as Consumer: The Case of the Criminal
Justice Act 1991" (1994) 57 Mod. L Rev. 534.
2 1 7 See Arthurs, supra note 115 at 50-51.
2 18 Ibid. at 47-50.
2 19 Albo, supra note 208 at 25.
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in political life, especially if they lack the material and cultural resources
to acquire information and make their voices heard. Public interest
groups, lobby organizations, independent think tanks, social action
groups, service agencies, and other intermediaries are critical facilitators
of deliberation and protest. However the non-governmental sector has
been significantly defunded in the name of deficit reduction, thus
neutralizing some of the most vocal watchdogs and critics of
government.220 A declining share of the remaining public funding is
delivered in the form of general operating grants. Instead, public
interest groups must chase a limited number of one-time research
grants, which do not assist in maintaining ongoing watching briefs or
lobbying efforts on the issues these groups have identified as most
important to them. As a consequence, the non-governmental scene is
increasingly dominated by those groups who can attract large private
donations. With the erosion of basic income security programs once
seen as an essential precondition for equal participation in the political
sphere, the energies of more radical groups are often channelled into
defending minimum welfare standards. 221  Without adequate
organizational resources and representation, no amount of fiscal
disclosure will enable marginalized groups to hold government
accountable to their interests.
The adoption of tax referenda laws by Alberta and Manitoba is
an especially beguiling appeal to the notion of more accountable
government. While direct democracy mechanisms have the potential to
enhance citizen participation, in the context of neoliberal restructuring,
they are more likely only to confirm and legitimate the views of more
powerful groups. It is highly significant that only tax increases, and not
expenditure cuts, are subject to popular approval. The strategy of
severing the link between taxation levels and the quality of public
services has proven very effective in securing consent (or the appearance
of consent) to the contraction of social spending.222 The concern is that
middle class and affluent citizens will vote down tax increases and that
instead of cutting services to these groups, governments will impose the
costs of maintaining a balanced budget on less privileged communities
who rely on state support to meet basic needs. This assumes, of course,
that referenda will actually be held. The more likely prospect is that
220 See A. Cardozo, "Lion Taming: Downsizing the Opponents of Downsizing" in Swimmer,
ed., supra note 170, 303.
221 Panitch, supra note 208 at 5-6; and I.M. Young, supra note 209 at 90.
222 Mackenzie, supra note 166 at 157-58. See also Brooks, supra note 190 at 158-59.
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governments will simply cut spending on their own initiative in order to
avoid taking a tax increase to the electorate.
In the event that referenda do occur, there is little evidence that
governments will take steps to provide marginalized groups with the
support they need to participate equally in the formulation of tax
proposals or in pre-referenda media campaigns or deliberative fora. In
addition to lacking the material resources to organize, these groups can
be effectively excluded from mainstream discourse by less tangible
constraints, such as the cultural devaluation of certain styles of
expression, or the tendancy of more privileged speakers to interrupt or
reinterpret remarks.22 3  In the current political environment,
governments are more likely to exacerbate than to counteract these
inequalities. The Alberta government, for example, has made a habit of
denigrating its critics as special interests that do not represent the views
of normal Albertans, and announcing cutbacks at such a rapid pace that
not even the media can provide informed analysis 224 Under conditions
of rising social disparity and decreasing acceptance of organized political
dissent, the introduction of direct democracy reforms will tend to
empower those whose voices already dominate, and to create a false
image of consensus around their views.
The most profound failing of balanced budget accountability
provisions, however, is that they falsely construct governments as the
major source of irresponsible power in our society, thus distracting
attention from the arbitrary private power exercised in markets. Fiscal
limitation laws do nothing to democratize private economic relations,
but worse than this, they attempt to constrain the very institutions of
state that have in the past provided our only significant check on
untramelled market forces. They internalize the demands of
transnational capital, and thereby diminish governments' capacity to
regulate economic power in the interests of its citizens. 225 While
balanced budget laws may appear superficially to advance democratic
values, in substance they are far more likely to diminish the space for
public discussion of substantive political choices.
223 See N. Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually
Existing Democracy" in Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the "Postsocialist" Condition (New
York and London: Routledge, 1997) 69 at 77-80; Kline, supra note 120; and I.M. Young,
"Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy" in Benhabib, ed., supra note
202, 120.
224 Thomlinson, supra note 139 at 18 and 21.
225 D. Schneiderman makes this argument in relation to free trade agreements, in "NAFrA's
Takings Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes to Canada" (1996) 46 U.T.LJ. 499 at 536.
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V. CONCLUSION
In analyzing the sudden rise of balanced budget laws in Canada,
this article has highlighted significant jurisdictional differences across
the country, as well as exposing a great deal of common ground, both
legally and politically. Certain provinces, most notably Saskatchewan
and New Brunswick, have taken pains to avoid some of the most
inefficient and socially unjust aspects of the worst models, which I
identify as Alberta's and Manitoba's. They have done so by calling for
budget balance over a multi-year cycle (rather than annually) and
making generous allowance for deficit spending if economic or other
conditions change. As well, they avoid debt reduction schedules that
mortgage future surpluses and preclude the restoration of public
spending for many years, and reject tax limitations and enforcement
penalties that hinder the capacity of elected governments to make
political judgments about the most appropriate fiscal policy. These
features mitigate some of the dangers that the most severe balanced
budget laws pose to economic stability, social justice and democracy.
However, given the neoliberal context within which governments
currently operate, I suggest there can be no such thing as a really good
fiscal limitation law. While the most extreme forms are very ill-advised
and should be repealed immediately, this is not to advocate enactment
of the kinder, gentler versions either.
Perhaps at some future conjuncture, when budgets are no longer
viewed above all as something to be balanced, but rather as a means of
financing an effective public sector, it may be useful to debate the
normative goals that should animate fiscal policy decisions, and even to
express those goals in legislative or constitutional form. In the present
reality, however, fiscal limits are likely to be formulated, interpreted, and
applied in ways that are economically foolish and socially regressive.
The rare government with some political will to resist the neoliberal
agenda will find that even a moderate fiscal limitation works to
strengthen the ideological premises of restructuring discourse, making
the retention of public services more difficult to defend. By constructing
government as prone to extravagance and inefficiency, and therefore in
need of external discipline and constraint, balanced budget laws affirm
the prevailing valorization of market forces as the best mechanism for
ordering social and economic affairs. In so doing, they inhibit attempts
to address the really serious problems of rising insecurity and inequality,
and the unaccountability of private accumulations of wealth to the needs
and interests of less privileged citizens. In short, while there are better
1996]
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and worse balanced budget laws in Canada, we would be best off without
any at all.
